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Like other studies of agenda setting, this research builds on the work of Baumgartner and 
Jones (1993), King (1997), Worsham (1997) and Tzoumis (2001), and most recently, 
Wilkerson, Feeley, Schiereck, and Sue (1999). Specifically, the focus of this study is on 
disaster relief policy.  Two basic objectives guide the study.  The first is to examine the 
origins and evolution of disaster relief policy in order to understand its shifting image. 
The second is to understand how Congress governs the agenda of disaster relief policy in 
the post-war period.  
 
The analysis in this dissertation is derived from data collected on disaster relief-related 
bills and hearings in Congress from 1947-2005. Through the utilization of both bill 
introductions and congressional hearings, general patterns of issue composition, 
committee competition and policy monopoly are examined.  
 
This study demonstrates that although congressional committees often serve as the 
institutional anchor for subsystem arrangement and a policy monopoly, punctuating 
events can alter the policy equilibrium maintained by such an arrangement.  
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Chapter One 
Introduction 
Natural disasters as focusing events are unpredictable and sudden and their 
occurrences are known simultaneously by the mass public and policy elites (Birkland, 
1998). Given their abrupt occurrence, natural disasters have an immense potential to 
reshape, change or influence the policy process. From 1947 to 2005, numerous disasters 
have shaped U.S. disaster relief policy as illustrated through the creation of the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS). Following the events of September 11, 2001 and Hurricane Katrina in 2005, one 
can say that disasters affect people and society in numerous ways. Whether man-made or 
natural, disasters challenge the operation, resilience, competence and responsiveness of 
the government (Sylves, 2008).   In an effort to understand how disaster relief is linked to 
the actions of government, it is important to examine the agenda in which policies are 
initiated and created.  
This research examines how the emphasis of disaster relief policy shifts between 
two dominant images-natural disaster and civil defense. A central concern is to explore 
how Congress has governed the agenda of disaster relief policy since the post-war era. 
The intent of this question is to analyze institutional factors that influenced the agenda of 
disaster relief policy. In addition, posing this question is important because it forces one 
to explore the linkage between civil defense and natural disaster as it relates to aspects of 
agenda setting. The implementation or effectiveness of disaster relief policy aimed at 
assessing emergency management is not reviewed, but I  will explore congressional 
agenda setting of disaster relief by measuring bill introductions and assessing 
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congressional hearing activities. To meet the above objective, the research is structured 
according to five areas of discussion and analysis. In chapter two, I describe the two 
types of agenda setting. This discussion serves as a conduit to developing the research 
theory; which is explicitly presented in the later portion of the chapter. Chapter three 
presents the historical development of disaster relief policy and FEMA. The discussion 
highlights when and how disaster relief emerges on the agenda as well as the interaction 
between the President and Congress. This chapter is significant because it seeks to 
accentuate the research question and its overall contribution. Chapters four and five 
illustrate how agenda dynamics in disaster relief are influenced by the institutional 
actions of congressional committees/subsystems as well as endogenous and exogenous 
punctuating events.  
Particularly, chapter four tracks the agenda status of civil defense and natural 
disaster by focusing on legislative bill introductions. Serving as a transition into chapter 
five, this discussion examines and compares the level of attention that both the House and 
Senate give to civil defense and natural disaster issues. In addition, this chapter tracks the 
referral of disaster relief bill introduction. The purpose of this analysis is to explore 
policy jurisdiction.  Chapter five expands on the importance of committee turf by 
exploring and assessing the agenda of disaster relief policy through the examination of 
legislative hearings. A committee may serve as the institutional anchor for subsystem 
arrangement and policy monopoly, but punctuating events may alter the equilibrium 
established by such arrangement. Moreover, not only can the equilibrium be disrupted, 
but such events can alter policy outputs as well. Finally, chapter six highlights how my 
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research contributes to the understanding of agenda setting as it relates to disaster relief 
policy and the steps that can be taken for future research.  
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Chapter 2 
Agenda Setting and Issue Definition 
Introduction 
The 20th century saw an increase in the occurrence of natural disasters. Local, 
state, and federal government mobilized in response to disasters such as the flood of 
1927, the Long Beach Earthquake of 1933, Hurricane Hazel of 1954, Hurricane Camille 
in 1965, the 1971 San Fernando Earthquake, Hurricane Hugo in 1989, the 1993 
Midwestern flood, and Hurricane Katrina in 2005, among others.  At the same time, the 
20th century saw increased attention to civil defense matters associated with two world 
wars, the Red Scare, the Cold War, and terrorism. These events put the discussion of 
disaster prevention and response on the congressional agenda, resulting in the amending 
of old policy as well as the creation of new policy. Disasters, as punctuating events, 
reshape how stakeholders such as politicians, policymakers and agencies, think about and 
respond to public policy. 
 
This study employs agenda setting theory to determine how and which 
institutional actors shape disaster relief policy. Agenda-setting may be defined as the 
process by which new issues get the attention of policy-makers and also refers to the 
manner in which those issues are defined and the effect of the definition on subsequent 
policy adoption (Garcia 2007, 1). Agenda-setting is not limited to new issues, but 
encompasses the movement of existing issues up and down the institutional agenda 
(Garcia 2007, 1). The agenda, as it applies to public policy, is defined as “the list of 
subjects or problems to which government officials, and people outside the government 
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closely associated with those officials, are paying some serious attention at any given 
point in time” (Kingdon, 1995, 3-4). Cobb and Elder (1972) distinguish two types of 
agendas: the systemic agenda and the institutional agenda  The systemic agenda 
incorporates, “all issues that are commonly perceived by members of the political 
community as meriting public attention and as involving matters within the legitimate 
jurisdiction of existing governmental authority” (Cobb and Elder, 1972, 85). In turn, the 
institutional agenda is composed of “that set of items explicitly up for the active and 
serious consideration of authoritative decision makers” (Cobb and Elder, 1972, 85). 
Given that claims of policy failure are often made by pro-change groups with the 
intention of expanding an issue, their efforts to move ideas from the systemic to the 
institutional agenda is the key to understanding the changing course of disaster relief 
policy. 
 
The Systemic Agenda 
The systemic agenda according to Cobb and Elder (1972, 85) involves, “all issues 
that are commonly perceived by members of a political community as meriting public 
attention and as involving matters within the legitimate jurisdiction of existing 
governmental authority.” Within the systemic agenda, the general public has the 
opportunity to discuss policy issues such as health care, drug abuse, environmental 
protection, and disasters, among others. Most of the items that appear on the systemic 
agenda are often general with no specific defined solution.  
Baumgartner and Jones build on Schattschneider’s work by describing how the 
strategic manipulation of a policy image by policy entrepreneurs often leads to conflict 
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expansion, the mobilization of new advocates, and the undoing of long-standing 
institutional structures (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993, 37). The manipulation of a policy 
image is exemplified in their study of agricultural policy, where the pesticides subsystem 
lost control of the agenda, as the issue was redefined to include not only economics but 
also health and environmental damage stemming from the application of pesticides. 
Overall, policy images play a critical role in the expansion of issues to the previously 
apathetic (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993, 25).  
Downs (1972) argues that public attention to political issues typically follow a 
cyclical pattern. Using environmental policy as a case study, Downs traced public interest 
in environmental policy through a life cycle of sorts. He opens with a pre-problem stage, 
where there are low levels of public attention, followed by a “state of alarmed discovery 
and euphoria generate much attention,” and end with a “realization of the costs of solving 
the problem and a gradual decline in public interest” (Downs, 1972, 10). For Downs, 
agenda setting was an exercise in futility; if the goal was lasting, public inspired policy 
change. Baumgartner and Jones employ Downs’ theory as support for their analysis of 
the role of the institutional venue in agenda formation. They refer to the Downsian cycle 
of interest attention as the “mobilization of enthusiasm” where those concerned with an 
issue demand governmental action, usually through the allocation of resources 
(Baumgartner and Jones, 1993, 890).  According to Baumgartner and Jones (1993, 88), a 
Downsian mobilization may create new policy monopolies or at least set the stage for  
new institutional arrangement and programs. 
Although both Schattschneider and Downs talk about issue expansion, the 
former’s “mobilization of criticism” breaks down rather than builds lasting institutional 
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arrangements. According to Baumgartner and Jones (1993, 101), both Downs’ (1972) and 
Schattschneider’s (1975) varieties of mobilization may occur relative to the same issue 
over a period of time (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993, 101). More importantly, these 
mobilizations may have important policy consequences, even though they may be 
opposite in terms of substance (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993, 84).  
Like Downs (1972) and Schattschneider (1975), Cobb and Elder (1972, 12) stress 
the power of the “pre-political” phase, stating that “pre-decisional processes often play 
the most critical role in determining what issues and alternatives are to be considered by 
the polity and the probable choices that will be made[…] the critical question becomes, 
how does an issue or demand become or fail to become the focus of concern and interest 
within a polity?” According to Cobb and Elder (1972), the answer is that a problem often 
gains standing on the systemic agenda only after its proponents engage additional 
advocates by redefining the issue; usually by substituting one policy image for another 
(Cobb and Elder, 1983, 47). The process of issue redefinition enables policy 
entrepreneurs to attract the attention of new groups by expanding the conflict associated 
with a particular policy issue or question. They suggest that issues on the systemic 
agenda are specific, relatively simple to understand or execute, have a large potential 
impact or long-term consequences, and involve a principle or precedent already set (Cobb 
and Elder 1972, 96-102).  
For Cobb and Ross (1997), not all issues make the agenda, because some 
individuals and groups work to keep topics from being addressed through the policy 
process. The authors focused on agenda denial, “the political process by which issues that 
one would expect to get meaningful consideration from the political institution in a 
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society fail to get taken seriously” (Cobb and Elder, 1997, xi). Agenda denial concerns 
tactics used by issue opponents to keep issue initiators from attaining success at any stage 
of the policy development.  
Cobb and Ross (1997) identified four levels of strategic choice of agenda denial 
along a cost analysis from low to high cost strategies. The first level, the low cost strategy 
emphasizes the non-recognition of the initiator position. The key element of this strategy 
is non-confrontation consisting of varying forms of denial. This strategy is characterized 
by the refusal to recognize that a problem exists, defining the problem as an isolated 
incident, and then refusing to recognize the existence of groups advocating the issue 
(Cobb and Ross, 1997, 10). The second strategy is the medium cost strategy where the 
goal is to attack either the issue or the initiating group. Here the strategy is allocation of 
blame. This strategy is characterized by the use of deception (lying, spreading false 
rumors, planting false stories, etc.) or distorting one’s position with a scientific façade 
(Cobb and Ross, 1997, 12). The third strategy is the medium cost strategy that consists of 
symbolic placation and is mostly used by public officials. It is characterized by the 
creation of a committee or commission to study the problem, postponement, and 
superficial actions that make no difference (Cobb and Ross, 1997, 12). The final strategy 
is the high cost strategy that consists of threats or violence. It includes electoral threats or 
the withholding of support, economic threats, legal actions, and physical threats (Cobb 
and Ross, 1997, 13). Cobb and Ross (1997) argue that an opponent seeks the desired 
result at the lowest cost possible but will gradually turn to higher cost strategies with the 
lack of success.   
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Nelson (1984), utilizing the issue of child abuse as a case study, examined, “how 
public officials learn about new problems, decide to give them their personal attention, 
and mobilize their organizations to respond to them” (Nelson, 1984, 20). Nelson cites 
five common catalysts for agenda setting: catastrophes, technological and demographic 
change, inequitable distribution of resources, organizational growth, and structural 
readiness for change (Nelson, 1984, 24). She focuses on an organizational approach to 
agenda setting and affirms “the process of agenda setting can be conceptualized as having 
four stages: issue recognition, issue adoption, setting priorities among issues, and issue 
maintenance” (Nelson, 1984, 22-23). In addition, she notes that the agenda setting stages 
will vary according to the type of issue, as well as what types of people and groups are 
participating in the process (Nelson, 1984, 25).  
Stone (1997), in her study of the political nature of public policy choices, noted 
that, “problem definition is a matter of representation because the description of a 
situation is a portrayal from only one many points” (Stone, 1997, 133).  Individuals, 
interest groups, and government agencies choose to portray an issue strategically, from 
different perspectives, in order to promote the course of action they perceive to be most 
to their advantage. For Stone (1997) the essence of policy making is “the struggle over 
ideas, a constant struggle over the criteria for classification, the boundaries of categories, 
and the definition of ideas that guide the way people behave” (Stone, 1997, 11).  
 Like Stone (1997), Baumgartner and Jones (1993) place an emphasis on the 
centrality and effects of issue definition. Issue definition is basic to their analysis of 
agenda access because it is able to provoke the punctuated equilibrium cycle in politics. 
Baumgartner and Jones (1993) argue that issue definition can attract interests that were 
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previously uninvolved with the issue, thereby resulting in a venue shift (Baumgartner and 
Jones, 1993, 25). There is a general agreement among scholars of public policy 
(Schattschneider, 1975; Cobb and Elder, 1983; Nelson, 1984; Carmines and Stimson, 
1989; Baumgartner and Jones, 1993; Kingdon, 1995; Stone, 1997; Cobb and Ross, 1997) 
that problem definition and the mobilization of previously uninterested groups are 
important factors in determining whether or not an issue reaches the systemic agenda. 
An important means of securing a place on the systemic agenda involves use of 
the media. The agenda setting capacity of the news media has been the object of a large 
amount of research in recent years. Stein (2001) posits that the more controversial the 
issue, the greater the need to inform the public and to gauge the public reaction to the 
proposed change. Information disseminated by the media tells us what and how to think 
about issues; thus setting the terms of any debate over controversial matters. Studies have 
shown that the media plays a role in shaping public opinion.  Cook (1998) develops a 
model of the media as an influential force in the agenda setting and public policy process. 
He writes “ the American news media can and do directly influence perceptions of public 
moods, and in other ways shape the context of one legislator asking another for support, 
whether or not the public was involved, has chosen sides or was even aware of the 
issues” (Cook, 1998,11).   
Cook (1998) views the media as a filter that functions as a conveyer of 
information to political actors. He also notes that political theorists such as Scattschneider 
who were working in the 1950s and 1960s witnessed a different political system than that 
of the mid-1990s. As a result, one no longer finds a stable situation, with a durable group 
of players negotiating according to agreed-upon rules. The current situation is fluid and 
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unstable, with political entrepreneurs and interest groups aggressively promoting not only 
policy issues but also their preferred solutions (Cook, 1998, 121). In Cook’s view, there 
is an ongoing, interactive process between public officials and journalists that has an 
influence on agenda setting: “Politicians dictate conditions and rules of access and 
designate certain events and issues as important by providing an arena for them. 
Journalists, in turn, decide whether something is interesting enough to cover, the context 
in which to place it, and the prominence the story receives”  
(Cook, 1998, 12). He uses the term “negotiation of newsworthiness” to describe the 
relationship between the media and political processes. Cook (1998) also argues that as a 
result of the lack of strong, pervasive institutions such as political parties, the news media 
has taken command of political communication (Cook, 1998, 83). 
A variety of studies suggest that the media is the primary source of information on 
national political matters including defense preparedness, foreign policy, youth crime, 
health care, and environmental issues (McCombs and Shaw 1972; Iyengar et al,1982; 
Nelson 1984; Linsky 1986; Page and Shapiro 1992; Trumbo 1995; Bartels 1996; Hacker 
1998; Baumgartner, et al 1997; Shepard 1998; Soroka 2002).  Baumgartner and Jones, in 
summing up this literature, as well as their own work, argue that “the media help create 
situations that make increased government attention almost unavoidable” (Baumgartner 
et al., 1997, 23). They argue that an issue’s policy image is determined largely by the 
“tone” of the media coverage. When rapid change in media coverage occurs, changes in 
the patterns of mobilization in the policy area are likely to follow.  
If the media is a vehicle for gaining entrance into the public agenda, others have 
argued that punctuating events work to advance issues on the agenda as well as to trigger 
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policy change (Cobb and Elder, 1983; Baumgartner and Jones, 1993; Kingdon 1995). 
Punctuating events may serve as a “window of opportunity” for politically disadvantaged 
groups, enabling them to forward an item that previously had been ignored by dominant 
groups and advocacy coalitions.  
Punctuating events allow interest groups, government leaders, policy 
entrepreneurs, the media and the citizenry to identify with a new problem or pay greater 
attention to existing but dormant problems. This increased awareness can help identify 
solutions in the wake of apparent policy failure. Even though groups attempt to refocus 
the public agenda via media attention, major punctuating events may reach the agenda 
with little if any promotion, when images and symbols of suffering are clearly visible. 
Media coverage of suffering as caused by natural and other non-natural disasters is not 
easily overlooked by an attentive public, nor easily constrained by the dominant policy 
monopolies. Outrage over policy failure, epitomized by media-generated images of 
devastation, is utilized by pro-change groups as a recruiting tool –thereby expanding the 
issue and transforming the issues into tangible evidence of the need for policy change 
(Birkland, 1998). 
According to Schattschneider (1975), issue expansion is important because it 
increases the likelihood that more influential and powerful actors will enter the conflict 
on the side of policy change. He suggests that an increase in attention can further tilt the 
balance of debate in favor of pro-change groups. Baumgartner and Jones (1993) echo 
Schattschneider’s argument, finding that policy under constant scrutiny is likely to be 
assessed negatively, compelling monopoly holders to accommodate dissenting views. 
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This tenure in the limelight is more likely to result in policy change as dissenters expect 
that their proposed solutions be implemented to salvage the failed policy.  
 
The Institutional Agenda 
The institutional agenda consists of a “set of items explicitly up for the active and 
serious consideration of authoritative decision makers” (Cobb and Elder, 1972, 85). The 
institutional or governmental agenda, often described as the action agenda, tends to be 
more specific and concrete in content than the systemic agenda. The institutional agenda, 
which refers to action by government to deal with an identified problem, is characterized 
by conflict and tension. The federal nature of the American government with its checks 
and balances sets the agenda up for intergovernmental conflicts in the policy process. 
Similarly, the separation of powers provides a variety of institutional venues at the 
national level to be targeted by those interested in moving an issue from the systemic to 
the government agenda. As Tzoumis (2001, 5) argues, a policy often reaches 
congressional attention because it has been framed or defined in a fashion that warrants 
governmental action.  
Like Tzoumis (2001), Baumgartner and Jones (1993) assert that the way in which 
a policy is framed is important because it determines the players and interests that will be 
involved in the issue. Schattschneider (1960) argues that policy losers strive to broaden 
the scope of the conflict in hopes of persuading nonparticipants into understanding the 
issue from their perspective. Thus, expanding the scope is significant because it is 
instrumental in determining how the issue is defined, and consequently which policy is 
implemented. Tzoumis (2001, 5) asserts that if an issue is defined in a manner in which 
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the government is willing to address, then it will have a greater propensity of capturing 
congressional attention. According to Eyestone (1978, 175), agenda status is primarily 
achieved only with regard to endemic issues-“public problems that extend over a period 
of years and generate incremental solutions.” He also suggests that Congress is 
consequential to the status of an issue because it is this institution that groups seek to 
access in order to have their problem addressed by policymakers. Kingdon (1995, 199) 
indicates groups who are able to gain access are far more likely to bolster their issues on 
the agenda and block consideration of proposal they do not prefer. Moreover, such 
groups are more likely to define the image of the issue according to their interests 
(Baumgartner and Jones, 1993).   
A change in policy venue can result in broadening the scope of the debate and 
often precedes the enactment of new policy (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993. 31). In many 
instances when the venue of a policy changes, those participants who previously had 
minimal influence may find themselves with greater power. Oftentimes, participants who 
form a subsystem can mold or define an issue in a manner consistent with their interests. 
A subsystem is defined as “a political alliance uniting members of an administrative 
agency, a congressional committee or subcommittee, and an interest group with shared 
values and preferences in the same substantive area of policy making” (Milakovick and 
Gordon, 2001, 89). Such an institutional arrangement can prohibit an array of interests 
from becoming involved in the policy making process, thus allowing the subsystem to 
define the issue accordingly, an in most cases at the expense of those formerly excluded. 
“ Subsystems then are a means of getting around the seeming inability of groups to effect 
closure on decisions that affect large number of interests” (Worsham, 2004, 4). Worsham 
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(1998, 486) argues that a “subsystem’s ability to maintain policy making autonomy is not 
absolute; but rather it varies across time and policy area.”  
Worsham (1998) illustrates that subsystem politics may assume any of three 
forms---dominant, transitory, or competitive coalitions. Dominant coalitions benefit 
select interests as opposed to the public interest. Under such an arrangement, a particular 
committee or subcommittee is able to establish and control a formidable jurisdiction in a 
particular policy area. Transitory coalitions emerge when “latent interests of some 
members of a dominant coalition supersede the interests they share in common with other 
members of the dominant coalition” (Worsham, 1998, 488). Competitive coalitions 
surface when a dominant coalition is openly challenged by a new coalition. In some 
cases, this may occur when transitory coalitions engage in prolonged conflict, in which 
formerly excluded minority interests are able to effectively compete over the benefits of a 
particular policy. Competition may also be the result of challenges by members of 
another committee (and subsystem), who, in response to perceived threats to their 
autonomy engage in turf wars (Ripley and Franklin 1986; King 1997). Challengers may 
simply be new arrivals in the policy domain who are in search of a subsystem 
(committee) niche of their own (Browne 1988). 
Other means of altering policy equilibrium involve the concerted efforts of policy 
entrepreneurs. Policy entrepreneurs are able to reframe issues so that favored solutions 
are given to problems. Sheingate (2006, 18) defines policy entrepreneurs as individuals 
whose creative acts have effects on politics, policies, and institutions and are a significant 
force in explaining subsystem variations. To him, entrepreneurs shape the terms of 
political debate, frame issues, affect politics, define problems, and influence agenda. 
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Entrepreneurs are also considered as source of innovations in terms of investing resources 
in the creation of new policies, agencies or the formation of new collective actions.   
 According to Baumgartner and Jones (1993), issue definition and institutional 
change can allow seemingly secure policies to experience unexpected shifts that alter the 
approach of the government to a topic. Institutional change often means 
committees/agencies in government responsible for a policy are expanded, or 
responsibility is shifted to other officials. Since government actors and structure generate 
or influence items on the institutional agenda, Baumgartner and Jones (1993) argue that 
understanding the dynamic of policy monopolies is essential.  
Baumgartner and Jones (2002,19) assert that positive feedback forces decision 
makers to shift their attention to previously excluded dimension of a problem, which in 
turn may alter subsystem arrangements. Positive feedback models are those in which 
“ideas of momentum, bandwagon effects, thresholds and cascades play critical roles” in 
the policy process (Baumgartner and Jones, 2002, 7). In short, positive feedback is often 
associated with punctuating moments that threaten existing subsystem arrangements. 
Positive feedback is also produced by the actions of policy entrepreneurs. Regardless of 
their institutional origin, entrepreneurs bring new ideas and new policy proposals that 
threaten to upset existing policy equilibrium. Positive feedback may also create new 
institutional arrangements, and thus create a new equilibrium that in turn reinforces new 
negative feedback processes.   
Negative feedback models posit that “ shocks to the system are 
dampened….pressures from one side lead to counterpressures from another side, and in 
general …self corrective mechanisms keep the system on an even keel” (Baumgartner 
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and Jones, 2002, 6).  In a negative feedback process “the system reacts to counterbalance, 
rather than reinforce, any changes coming from the environment” thus changes are likely 
to be incremental (Baumgartner and Jones, 2002, 9). In this process, equilibrium is 
produced by institutional arrangements that allow groups to achieve their particular 
interests. Such arrangements favor the status quo.  Although Baumgartner and Jones 
(1993) view positive and negative feedback as representing “patterns of punctuated 
change,” they suggest that positive feedback ought not to count as the only instance of 
“punctuated equilibrium”(Baumgartner and Jones, 1993, 244). 
For Baumgartner and Jones, issues that reach the agenda through a wave of 
popular enthusiasm or “Downsian mobilization,” propel political leaders to delegate 
power to experts who were able to convince them that they can solve the problem. In the 
instances that issues reach the agenda through criticism or “Schattschneider 
mobilization,” political leaders pay attention to the details of the policymaking process 
within a specialized policy community (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993, 84). According to 
them, these two types of mobilization can lead to opposite institutional responses: the 
waves of enthusiasm lead to the creation of governmental institutions and subsystems, 
while the waves of criticism lead to their breakup.  
In keeping with Baumgartner and Jones’ (1993) approach of punctuated 
equilibrium and the important role of positive and negative feedback in politics, this 
study uses bill introductions and congressional hearings to trace attention over time of 
disaster relief policy in the United Sates. To illustrate how the aforementioned 
perspectives and insights to agenda setting are conceptualized throughout the remainder 
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of this research the following section highlights the theoretical framework underlying the 
analysis.   
 
Design and methods 
Like others who have made an effort to track agenda entrance by focusing on 
congressional activity, in this study I focus on bill introductions and hearings. Like 
Baumgartner and Jones (1993, 2002), I review Congressional hearing activities and bill 
introductions, to get a feel for the level of competition in the disaster relief policy 
domain. Following their lead (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993, 2002) and employing data 
assembled in the Policy Agendas Project, I employ the annual number of congressional 
hearings convened on disaster relief issues as an indicator of congressional attention and 
priority regarding this policy arena. The coverage of congressional hearings on an issue 
signals the importance of that issue to Congress. It is worth noting that committee 
hearings are consequential beyond the limited confines of the particular committee in 
which they are held. These hearings provide information to the entire Congress, both 
through the intrinsic generation of information and, notably from the very decision to 
hold a hearing on a particular topic (Diermeier and Feedersen, 2000, 10). Furthermore, 
hearings provide outlets for interest groups to express policy preferences and allow 
members of Congress to develop policy proposals. These proposals are then available in 
the event that conditions become conducive for major policy change.   
Dearing and Rogers, (1996, 1) posit that agenda setting is “an ongoing 
competition among issue proponents to gain the attention of policy elites.” Bill 
introductions are therefore useful in understanding this process because they serve as an 
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important indicator of the chamber’s interest in a particular policy area (Worsham, 2004; 
Wilkerson et al., 1999).  Employing data assembled by the Congressional Bills Project 
and THOMAS, I employ the annual number of bill introductions in both chambers as an 
indicator of congressional attention regarding this policy arena. Besides indicating that an 
issue has made it on the agenda, bill introduction illustrates committee jurisdiction.  
 
Conclusion 
 Scholars have argued that problem definition influences agenda setting as well as 
policy adoption (Schattschneider, 1975; Baumgartner and Jones, 1993; Kingdon, 1995). 
How problems are defined or framed determines what factual evidence is relevant, which 
solutions or alternatives are considered effective and feasible, who participates in the 
decision process, and eventually, who wins and loses. It is obvious that problem 
definitions draw attention to some conditions in society at the expense of others; locate 
the causes of the problems; direct the public and elite interest, and subsequently shape 
and mobilize political participation (Haider-Markel et al., 2001). When a new issue 
definition emerges on the political agenda it is either propelled by a punctuating event or 
may dismantle an existing “policy monopoly” and thereby lead to policy change 
(Baumgartner and Jones, 1993; Kingdon, 1995; Haider-Markel, 1999).     
 Setting the agenda involves not only getting issues onto an agenda, but also being 
able to determine the way in which those issues are defined (Beder, 2002, 25).  In 
essence, agenda setting is an exercise of power and influence.  This study assumes that 
although congressional disaster relief committees may have direct influence over the 
policy, events and inputs from the environment can influence their agenda setting 
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pursuits and activity. Consequently, the thrust of punctuating events and the actions of 
other institutional actors and or groups can reinforce or counterbalance the political 
underpinnings involved in the policy equilibrium.  With this in mind, the following 
chapters seek to understand the disaster relief agenda over the post-war era.  
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Chapter Three 
 
The Historical Development of Disaster Relief Policy 
 
According to the International Federation of the Red Cross, the Red Crescent 
Societies (IFRC), the Center for Research on Epidemiology of Disasters, and the Anton 
Brein Centre for Public Health and Tropical Medicine, the risk of disasters occurring is 
increasing. With almost two billion people adversely affected by disasters in the past ten 
years (Campbell, 2005; IFRC, 2001), Leus (2000) argues that “disaster could only 
become more frequent as population increases.” Similarly, Kizer (2000) cautions that 
because of population growth and urbanization, we should expect an increased mortality 
rate from both natural and man made disasters simply because of the greater population 
density. Clearly, interest in disasters and disaster relief have increased in the past decade, 
making them an object of increasing interest among those concerned with both disaster 
relief policy and the policy process in general. 
Essentially, the politics of disaster relief matter because they are directly or 
indirectly connected to public policy issues. Once disasters strike, they attain immediate 
agenda status and provide a window of opportunity for political action. As such, 
policymakers have used the situation to show their concern for citizens’ needs and 
demands as well as reinvent institutional structures.   Although disasters are unique, 
governmental actions encompass all aspect of the agenda setting process in the United 
States.  
In order to understand the politics of disaster relief, this chapter tracks the 
entrance and evolution of natural disaster relief as a topic on the public and government 
agendas. The story involves the transformation of responsibility for natural disaster relief 
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from a private concern, to a state and local governmental responsibility, and eventually, 
one in which the federal government must shoulder the load. 
I. Gaining Agenda Access: Reinterpreting “Acts of God” 
From its earliest days, disaster relief responsibilities were left to individuals and 
charitable organizations, or volunteers at the community level (Birkland, 1997; Sylves, 
2008). In essence, there was no expectation that the federal government would become 
directly involved in disaster relief. The federal government was asked to step in and help 
only when events exceeded the capacity of local and states authorities. Following few 
disasters and the awareness of extensive, long-lasting devastation to victims, and 
communities, the federal government began to take minimal actions.   The first example 
of federal emergency assistance involved a congressional act to provide financial 
assistance to a New Hampshire town that had been devastated by fire in 1803 (Sylves, 
2008).  
Despite several catastrophic incidents in the late 19th and  early 20th centuries, 
including the 1889 flood in Johnstown, Pennsylvania that involved 2,200 fatalities, the 
1900 Galveston Hurricane with 12, 000 fatalities and the 1906 San Francisco Earthquake 
which incurred 8,000 fatalities, the federal government did not place a significant 
emphasis on disaster relief. That being said, the federal government did practice a 
variation of preventive policy that centered on the construction of levees by the Army 
Corps of Engineers. Still, for the most part, the federal government viewed natural 
disasters, such as floods, as “Acts of God” and left the bulk of relief efforts in the hands 
of the local community (Platt, 1999, 2).  
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If the federal government was reluctant to assume responsibility for the 
prevention and relief of natural disasters, it proved more willing to assume a proactive 
stance in civil defense, establishing a civilian defense system in 1916 that provided for a 
range of actions to protect the general public in the event of an attack. The Council on 
National Defense was created to coordinate the “resources and industries for national 
defense” and “stimulate civilian morale” under the aegis of the War Department and its 
ancillary departments (DHS, 2006, 5). As a presidential advisory board, its works 
escalated when the United States entered the war in 1917 and was suspended in 1921 
once hostilities ended.   
The “Acts of God” policy image changed after the 1927 Great Mississippi Flood, 
when business found flooding to be even more important than taxation (Platt, 1999).  
Following the flood, various bills were introduced, and the Committee on Flood Control 
held hearings. In 1928, Congress passed the Flood Control Act, which marked the first 
permanent federal involvement in managing natural disasters. The bill not only 
authorized the Army Corps of Engineers to start levee construction along major 
waterways, but also allocated funds for rebuilding in the areas devastated by the floods. 
Clearly congressional opinion about the focus of responsibility for natural disaster relief 
and prevention began to change, culminating in the first ever-permanent fund for flood 
control activities (Holahan and Steed, 2008, 10).  
Arguably, it was the events associated with an economic disaster, the Great 
Depression that provided the window of opportunity for those interested in making 
disaster prevention and relief a federal responsibility.  The Army Corps of Engineers, the 
Reconstruction Finance Corporation, the Bureau of Public Roads, and the Flood Control 
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Act of 1934 all came out of that period (Haddow and Bullock, 2006, 3). Reactive in 
nature, these governmental actions authorized the financing, construction, and 
maintenance of thousands of miles of levees, floods walls, and tunnels throughout the 
U.S (Schneider, 1995). It is important to note that no attention was given to nonstructural 
programs that could actually encourage citizens and communities to prepare for disasters 
before they occurred (Schneider, 1995).  
As World War II ignited in Europe, President Roosevelt, in the act of setting an 
agenda, reestablished the Council of National Defense in 1940 where states were once 
again asked to establish local counterpart councils. Tensions among federal, state and 
local governments began to rise about the authority and resources (DHS, 2005, 5). On 
one hand, the states claimed that they were not given enough power to manage civil 
defense tasks in their own jurisdictions, while the local governments asserted that state 
governments did not give urban areas proper consideration and resources. As such, non-
attack disaster preparedness remained almost entirely the responsibility of states, while 
the federal funding was reserved primarily for attack preparedness. Given the extensive 
civilian bombing going on in Europe, concerns about possible attacks against the U.S. 
increased.  President Roosevelt responded to the increasing concern of the public and 
local officials by creating the Office of Civilian Defense in 1941 (DHS, 2005, 5). The 
office was delegated to protect civilians which include morale maintenance, promotion of 
volunteer involvement, nutrition and physical education.  Like the Council of National 
Defense, the Office of Civilian Defense created corresponding defense councils at the 
local government level. For example, the Office of Civilian Defense began the 
development of concrete civil defense plans, which include air raid drills, black outs, and 
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sand bag stockpiling (DHS, 2005, 6).  With the end of World War II, most U.S. officials 
agreed that the risk of an attack on the U.S. was minimal and as a result once in office 
President Truman abolished the Office of Civilian Defense.  
Even though the war was over, the Soviet Union’s pursuit of a nuclear bomb 
threatened the U.S. From this perspective, President Truman reexamined the national 
defense structure while Congress passed the National Security Act of 1947. This act 
created the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), as well as the National Security 
Resources Board, which was responsible for mobilizing civilian and military support, and 
maintaining adequate reserves and effective resources in the event of war ( DHS, 2005, 
7). As U.S. relations with the Soviet Union became increasingly strained, President 
Truman began to implement civil defense policy reforms, by establishing the Office of 
Civil Defense Planning, the Office of Defense Mobilization in 1950, with the belief that 
civil defense responsibilities should fall mostly in the hands of the state and local 
governments.   
Subsequently, Congress responded by enacting the Federal Civil Defense Act of 
1950. This act placed most of the civil defense burden on the states and created the 
Federal Civil Defense Administration which was to formulate a national policy to guide 
the states’ efforts. The act also allocated significant funding for shelter initiative. As the 
Federal Civil Defense Administration led shelter building, coordination between the 
federal and states, establishment of attack warning system, stockpiled supplies and 
national civic education campaign, Congress became increasingly concern about federal 
disaster assistance, especially in the aftermath of major disasters that grabbed the nation’s  
attention, for example, the flooding the Midwest ( DHS, 2005, 8).  
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This concern was followed by the passage of the Federal Disaster Relief Act of 
1950. The act was designed to lessen the economic impact of disasters on state and local 
governments, and was also the first in a series of bills that transitioned the federal 
government from its negligible pre-1950 disaster commitment to the current structure 
(DHS, 2007, 7). The act authorized funding for the repair of local public facilities upon 
presidential approval (Bea, 2005, 80). For the most part, disaster relief policy consisted of 
disaster specific legislation enacted in the aftermath of catastrophic disasters like the 
1964 Alaska earthquake, the 1964-65 winter floods in the Pacific Northwest, and 
Hurricane Betsy in 1965. The rationale for specific legislation after each disaster was that 
each presented “an unparalleled disaster [that] requires extraordinary measures” (Bea, 
2007, 22).  
Despite the magnitude and frequency of disasters, not a single authority had 
primary responsibility for disaster relief. Rather, control of disaster relief programs 
shifted from  the Federal Civil Defense Administration (1943-1958), to the Housing and 
Home Finance Agency (1951-52), to the Office of Civil Defense and Mobilization (1958-
1962), to the Office of Emergency Planning (1962-1974) and ultimately to the Federal 
Disaster Assistance Administration of the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban 
Development (1974-1979) (Platt 1999,15). The evolution of disaster relief policy during 
this time period took the form of two distinct streams of legislation: one that dealt with 
general disaster relief provisions and another that dealt with loans for business, 
individuals, and farmers (May, 2005, 11).  
Following a series of major disasters that rattled the nation--Hurricane Hilda in 
New Orleans in 1964, the Alaskan earthquake in 1964, Hurricane Betsy in the southeast 
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in 1965, and the violent tornado that swept through Indiana on Palm Sunday in 1965, 
Senator Birch Bayh of Indiana, acting as an entrepreneur, sponsored a legislation in 1965 
that granted emergency federal loans assistance to disaster victims. In 1966, the Disaster 
Relief Act was passed to codify existing law and provide relief assistance for higher 
education institutions and rural communities. The act formulated a “dual-use approach” 
policy as a means to link civil defense warning systems with threats from natural 
disasters. The policy instructed the Defense Department to use civil defense activities to 
prepare for natural disaster mitigation and preparedness (Sylves, 2008, 50).  Once in 
office, President Gerald Ford repealed the “dual-use approach” policy, returning civil 
defense to its previous function, primarily a nuclear attack preparedness program. He also 
eliminated funding for natural disaster mitigation and preparedness (Sylves, 2008, 50). 
The congressional response was to amend the Civil Defense Act of 1950 authorizing 
funding on a dual-use basis “to prepare for the threat of enemy attack and for natural 
disasters” (Sylves, 2008, 50).  In addition, the Disaster Relief Act of 1974 empowered the 
president to provide different levels of federal aid by creating two classes of disasters--
major and emergency (May, 2005, 22). The act also increased the level of aid available 
and made nonprofit entities eligible for federal assistance. In spite of financial resources 
made available by Congress, disaster preparedness and response programs though various 
agencies remained fragmented.  
 
II. Civil Defense versus Natural Disasters  
While the focus of policy responsibility for natural disaster relief and prevention 
was increasingly seen as federal, disaster relief policy took another turn with the accident 
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at the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant near Middletown, Pennsylvania, in 1978. 
The incident brought to attention the lack of adequate off-site preparedness around 
commercial nuclear power plants, as well as showed the role the federal government 
played in regulating safety. On June 19, 1978 President Carter submitted Reorganization 
Plan No. 3 to Congress with the aim of establishing a single entity to serve as the sole 
federal agency responsible for “anticipating, preparing for, and responding to major civil 
emergencies” (Sylves, 2008, 56).  The act created the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency (FEMA), which reports directly to the President, and assumed the functions of 
the National Fire Prevention Control Administration, the Federal Insurance 
Administration, the Federal Broadcast System, the Civil Defense Preparedness Agency, 
the Federal Disaster Assistance Administration, and the Federal Preparedness Agency.  
In addition, FEMA also took responsibility of oversight of the Earthquake 
Hazards Reduction Program, coordination of dam safety, and the natural and nuclear 
disaster warning system. The additional responsibilities include assistance to 
communities in the development of readiness plans for severe weather-related 
emergencies, and the coordination of preparedness and planning to reduce the 
consequences of major terrorist incidents (Bea, 2002, 25).  
A second executive order, 12148, mandated the reassignment of agencies, 
programs, and personnel into this newly established organization and established the 
Federal Emergency Management Council composed of FEMA, the Director of the Office 
of Management and Budget (OMB), and others as determined by the President (Bea, 
2002, 28).  FEMA’s primary role was to serve as the single point of contact for all federal 
emergency preparedness, planning, response and mitigation activities. The varying 
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functions that FEMA would be required to take charge of made establishing effective 
leadership one of the focal points of FEMA policy.  
One of the main challenges facing FEMA as a new organization was to create an 
environment conducive to its own organizational culture, bureaucratic processes and 
identity, irrespective of the various agencies now under its leadership. Perhaps because of 
this, President Carter appointed John Macy, a member of his cabinet and the former head 
of the Office of Personnel Management, as the first director of FEMA. Establishing 
coherence and unity in FEMA was inherently difficult due to the variety of potential 
political problems posed by the reorganization of preexisting program responsibilities. In 
consolidating previously separate programs, the new agency entered a jurisdictional 
minefield that involved 23 congressional committees and subcommittees claiming 
responsibility over some portion of FEMA’s policy jurisdiction (Haddow and Bullock, 
2006, 6).  
  In 1982, President Reagan appointed Louis O. Guiffrida as director of FEMA. 
General Guiffrida, (a friend of Edward Messe, one of Reagan’s closest advisers) whose 
background was in training and terrorism preparedness at the state government level, 
reorganized FEMA according to administration policies. As a result, emphasis was 
placed on government preparedness for a nuclear attack (Haddow and Bullock, 2006, 10).  
Haddow and Bullock (2006) argue that resources and budget authority were both 
realigned to enhance and elevate the national security preparedness of the agency at the 
expense of natural disasters.  
With this new direction, state directors of emergency management who had 
lobbied for the creation of FEMA witnessed a decline in both their authority and federal 
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funding (Haddow and Bullock, 2006, 11). In addition, the fire service community was in 
an uproar as General Guiffrida’s reorganization measures diminished the authority of the 
U.S. Fire Administration by making it part of FEMA’s Directorate of Training and 
Education. Guiffrida and top aides eventually resigned in response to charges levied in 
congressional hearings that included the misuse of government funds (Haddow and 
Bullock, 2006, 8).  
President Reagan next selected General Julius W. Becton, Jr. to replace Guiffrida 
as director of FEMA. Becton, a retired Army Lieutenant General, had been the director of 
the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance in the State Department, and thus might be 
viewed as a compromised candidate of sorts by those pushing for a focus on natural 
disasters. Still, Becton did not neglect the civil defense dimension, expanding the duties 
of FEMA to include off-site cleanup of chemical stockpiles on military bases (Haddow 
and Bullock, 2006, 8). Because FEMA had minimal technical expertise to administer the 
cleanup program, it came to depend on the Army for implementation, greatly limiting its 
role in science, while also lessening attention to local emergency management operations 
(Haddow and Bullock, 2006, 8).  
Much as his predecessor had, Becton ranked earthquake, hurricane, and flood 
programs near the bottom of FEMA policy priorities. The congressional response was as 
expected; Senator Albert Gore (D-TN) raised questions regarding FEMA’s 
responsibilities as leading agency for the National Earthquake Hazards Reduction 
Program (NEHRP).  Gore, as member of the Senate Commerce Committee, urged FEMA 
to collaborate with its federal, state, and local partners on natural hazards planning 
(Haddow and Bullocark 2006, 8). In response to Gore’s suggestions and to the concerns 
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regarding non-attack preparedness during the final years of Reagan’s administration, the 
Meese Memorandum (Executive Order 12656) was signed in 1986 delegating the 
response role to federal agencies depending on the type of disaster.  
Congress followed up the following year by passing the Robert T. Stafford 
Disaster Relief and Emergency Act (PL 93-288) in 1988, in an effort to redirect FEMA 
towards prevention and relief of natural disasters. The act provided authority for the 
federal government to respond to disasters and emergencies in order to provide assistance 
to save lives and protect public health, safety, and property (Bea, 2002, 6).  
Still, at the end of the 1980s, FEMA suffered from severe problems, disparate 
leadership and conflicts with its partners at the state and local level over agency spending 
and priorities (Haddow and Bullock, 2006, 9). In 1989, two devastating natural disasters 
served as punctuating events that called the continued existence of FEMA into question. 
In September, Hurricane Hugo landed in North Carolina and South Carolina, causing 
more than $15 billion of damages and 85 deaths. Later that year, the Loma Prieta 
earthquake struck the San Francisco Bay Area of California, killing 63, injuring 3,757, 
and leaving approximately 8,000 to 12,00 people homeless ( Haddow and Bullock, 2006, 
10). . FEMA’s response to these disasters was slow. The agency waited on the 
bureaucratic process to work and for the governors to decide what to do before acting. 
For example, Senator Ernest Hollings (D-SC), acting as an entrepreneur personally called 
FEMA’s director, asked for help, but the agency moved slowly (Bullock, et al., 2006, 6). 
As a result, federal assistance arrived days later than it might have.  
Summarizing FEMA’s problems, a 1991 GAO study found FEMA was “not 
prepared to take over the state’s role as immediate responder when the state’s resources 
32 
 
were overwhelmed and had placed little emphasis on preparing for long-term recovery in 
the aftermath of a disaster” (GAO Report, 1991,43 ). The report criticized FEMA’s 
actions during the response to the two 1989 disasters as “inefficient and uncoordinated” 
(GAO-RCED-91-43, 66).  The report largely focused on the administrative problems 
within the agency, such as the high turnover rate among agency personnel and FEMA’s 
problems of coordination with state and local agencies. 
In April of 1992, the Federal Response Plan was developed as an answer to 
FEMA’s problems. The purpose of the Federal Response Plan (known simply as the 
Plan) was to address the consequences of any disaster or emergency in which there was 
need for federal response assistance under the authorities of the Stafford Act (Bea, 2002, 
18). The Plan used a functional approach to group the types of federal assistance that 
states are likely to need under Emergency Support Functions (ESF): public works and 
engineers, transportation, information and planning, communications, health and medical 
services, fire fighting, urban search and rescue, mass care, resource support, hazardous 
material, and energy.  
Primary governmental agencies charged with implementing function-based 
responses are selected to head the ESFs based on authority, resources, and capabilities. 
The primary purpose of the Plan was “to establish fundamental assumptions and policies 
as well as establish a concept of operations that provided an interagency coordination 
mechanism to facilitate the immediate delivery of federal response assistance” (PL 93-
288).   
The Plan applied to all federal government disaster response activities, but did not 
address recovery assistance. According to Hogue and Bea (2006), Sylves and Cumming 
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(2004), and Bea (2002), the most important element of the Plan was to supplement state 
and local government response efforts. ESFs were to be implemented via coordination 
between the federal officers and state officials, who would work to identify specific 
response requirements and provide necessary federal response assistance based on state-
identified priorities. The plan assigned roles to 27 federal agencies and the American Red 
Cross in the event of a large-scale disaster. In addition, relief efforts could be activated 
whether or not a presidential declaration of a major disaster was in effect, essentially 
bypassing the White House (Sylves and Cumming, 2004, 15).  
The Plan was put to the test in 1992, when Hurricane Andrew hit south Florida as 
a category 4 Hurricane and the central Louisiana coast as a category 3 Hurricane.  
FEMA’s response was harshly criticized with detractors who noted that “thousands of 
homeless Floridians searched days for food, water, and help while relief efforts lagged” 
(Davis in Hogue and Bea, 2006, 17). FEMA’s inability to respond was due to the fact that 
nobody at the local, state, or federal level understood the severity of the damage, and 
failed to rapidly assess the extent of the damage, and to deploy essential relief (Mener, 
2007, 28). This suggests in essence, that the Plan was not well developed into an 
operational strategy.  In an attempt to address the anemic response, President George H. 
W. Bush bypassed FEMA and sent in a task force led by Secretary of Transportation 
Andrew H. Card, Jr., to coordinate the response (Schneider, 1995, 81).   
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III. Restructuring FEMA  
FEMA’s poor performance during the response to Hurricane Andrew led 
Congress to call for an evaluation and reformation of the agency. As a result, Congress 
instructed FEMA to contract with the National Academy of Public Administration 
(NAPA) for “a comprehensive and objective study of the Federal, state and local 
government’s capabilities to respond promptly and effectively to major natural disasters 
occurring in the United States” (Cong. Rec., 1992,  63). The congressionally mandated 
NAPA report was issued in February of 1993. The report addressed the viability of 
FEMA and stated that “emergency management and FEMA are overseen by too many 
congressional committees, none of which has either the interest [in] or a comprehensive 
overview of the topic to assure that coherent federal policy is developed and 
implemented” (NAPA Report 1993, 2). To be successful, the agency would need a more 
coherent legislative charter, greater funding flexibility, and sustained support for building 
an effective agency and a national emergency management system response (NAPA 
Report, 1993, 2). 
After months of testimony, the GAO issued a report in July of 1993 
recommending that, “in order to underscore the commitment of the President, 
responsibility for catastrophic disaster preparedness and response should be placed with a 
key official in the White House” (GAO Report, 1993, 2). The report noted that: 
a disaster unit is needed to provide the White House and the Director of FEMA 
with information, analysis, and technical support to improve federal decision-
making on helping state and local governments before, during and after 
catastrophic disasters . . . the FEMA directorates whose resources would form the 
disaster unit—National Preparedness and State and Local Programs and 
Support—have historically not worked well together. 
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The report concluded by suggesting that major reorganization was needed (GAO Report, 
1993, 3). These recommendations were considered by President Clinton as well as 
Congress, but instead of reorganizing the whole disaster response system, they made 
minor administrative and structural changes (Miskel, 2006, 88). These changes were 
made because FEMA had high rates of turnover among agency personnel, as well as 
problems dealing with states and local agencies (Waugh, 2000, 28).  
In 1993, President Clinton appointed James L. Witt as the new Director of FEMA. 
With a strong interest in matters of disaster policy, President Clinton helped improve both 
the substance and image of FEMA operations. As part of the National Performance 
Review (NPR) process, in association with the administration’s efforts to reinvent 
government, the NPR recommended   
shifting FEMA’s resources and focus from preparedness for nuclear war to 
preparation for, and response to, all disasters; developing a more anticipatory and 
customer-driven response to catastrophic disasters; creating results-oriented 
incentives to reduce the costs of disaster; and developing a skilled management 
team among political appointees and career staff. (Hogue and Bea, 2006, 17) 
 
As the director, Witt reorganized the agency in accordance with many of the 
NAPA and GAO recommendations (Hogue and Bea, 2006, 17). For Schneider (2008, 
42), Witt’s focus on “all hazards” was at the forefront of FEMA’s mission and redirected 
the agency’s focus from nuclear attacks to natural disasters. Inside the agency, Witt 
reached out to all employees and implemented customer service training; he also 
reorganized and supported the use of new technologies to deliver disaster services and 
placed an emphasis on mitigation and risk avoidance (Haddow and Bullock, 2006, 10). 
Outside the agency, he strengthened the relationships with state and local emergency 
managers and built new ones with the House Armed Services, Veteran Affairs, Energy 
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and Commerce committees, the Clinton administration, and the media (Haddow and 
Bullock, 2006, 10). His relationship with Congress was exemplified in the laws that were 
passed that focus on preparedness. For example, the disaster relief legislation passed in 
1996 and 1998 improved hazards mitigation and relocation assistance as well as 
established an advisory commission to provide advice and recommendation. 
According to Bea (2006), under Witt, FEMA was able to develop its first new 
mission statement in ten years, which emphasized comprehensive, risk-based, all hazards 
management program of mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery. In addition, 
FEMA’s future management decisions and programs were based on six goals related to 
the new mission. The first goal was to create an emergency management partnership with 
other federal agencies, state and local governments, volunteer organizations, and the 
private sector. The second goal was to establish, in concert with FEMA’s partners, a 
comprehensive, risk-based, and all-hazards approach. This goal was to be followed by 
making hazard mitigation the foundation of the national emergency management system. 
The fourth goal was to provide a rapid and effective response to any disaster. The fifth 
goal was to strengthen state and local emergency management, as well as revitalize the 
agency and develop a more effective and involved cadre of FEMA managers, permanent 
employees, and disaster reservists (Bea, 2006, 2). Overall, FEMA’s “dominant 
philosophy became one of customer service” where the focus was on citizens either 
preparing for or recovering from disasters (Anderson, 2001, 71).  
Witt’s reorganization, in accordance with many of the NAPA and GAO 
recommendations, established three functional directorates to correspond with major 
phases of emergency management: a Preparedness, Training, and Exercises Directorate, a 
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Response and Recovery Directorate, and a Mitigation Directorate. The Preparedness 
Directorate funds state and local disaster planning as well as coordinates federal 
interagency planning for disaster response and continuity of government in the event of a 
federal government crisis (CRS, 2004; FEMA 2006, 3). In addition, the Preparedness 
Directorate relies on a systemic conceptualization of emergency management to identify 
threats, hazards, and vulnerabilities (Sylves, 2008, 23). For example, the standards used 
also known as the EMAP standards are based on the National Fire Protection Association 
1600 Standards. These standards were developed by state, local and federal emergency 
management practitioners in order to improve emergency coordination and response 
(Sylves, 2008, 23).  
First, the Response Directorate coordinates federal operational and logistical disaster 
response capability needed to save and sustain lives, minimize suffering, and protect 
property in a timely and effective manner in communities that become overwhelmed by 
natural disasters, acts of terrorism, or other emergencies (CRS, 2004, 22; FEMA, 2006). 
The response segment is often the most dramatic phase of the disaster cycle because it 
entails applying intelligence to lessen the effects or consequences of an incident (Sylves, 
2008).  
Second, the Recovery Directorate ensures that individuals and communities affected 
by disasters of all sizes are able to return to normal function with minimal suffering and 
disruption of services (FEMA, 2006, 3). This stage of the disaster cycle is the most 
expensive phase since it involves restoration, rebuilding, and a return to normalcy. At this 
phase, decisions regarding the recovery process are made at the local level of government 
(Sylves, 2008).  
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Finally,the Mitigation Directorate defines hazard mitigation as sustained action 
taken to reduce or eliminate long-term risk to people and their property from hazards and 
their effects (FEMA, 2006, 1). The Mitigation Division is comprised of three branches: 
the Risk Analysis, the Risk Reduction and the Risk Insurance (CRS, 2004, 22; FEMA, 
2006, 3).  This state of the disaster cycle requires partners outside the traditional 
emergency management system. An example is the partnership of land-use planners with 
construction and building officials as well as with community leaders. The tools of 
mitigation include hazard identification and mapping and building codes (Purpura, 207, 
284).  
To facilitate inter-agency cooperation, Congress amended the Robert T. Stafford 
Disaster Relief and Emergency Act in 1993 to authorize a program for pre-disaster 
mitigation and streamline the administration of disaster relief (Anderson, 2001).  This 
shift in prevention was due in part to disasters that transpired during the year (i.e. the 
Great Midwest Flood and the bombing of the World Trade Center). Congress also 
included the development of multi-agency Emergency Response Teams, Emergency 
Support Teams, and Field Assessment Teams with the ability to respond to disasters 
within four hours of occurrence (Anderson, 2001, 72). By working closely with the 
interagency Catastrophic Disaster Response Group, which served as the focal point for 
the Federal Response Plan, Witt promoted a risk-based, all-hazards emergency 
management system and directed regional offices to work closely with their state and 
local counterparts on a regular basis (Anderson, 2001, 73; FEMA, 1994).  
Despite the fact that the agency made significant improvements, FEMA was not 
free from challenges. During this time, FEMA was strongly criticized for not addressing 
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special needs populations during disasters (FEMA, 1994). Studies by Daniels and Clark-
Daniels (2000, 35) and Hogue and Bea (2006, 18) found that FEMA still had to improve 
in two areas: financial management and the disaster declaration process. These two areas 
of improvement were put to test following the Great Midwest Floods of 1993. The 
recovery phase of this disaster offered opportunity for mitigation actions.  FEMA used 
this window of opportunity to change the focus of post disaster recovery by initiating the 
largest voluntary buyout and relocation program to date in an effort to move people out 
of the floodplain and out of harm’s way (Haddow and Bullock, 2006, 11). The following 
year, FEMA faced another challenge: the Northridge, California Earthquake of 1994. 
This earthquake tested the new streamlined approaches and technological advancements 
in service delivery (Haddow and Bullock, 2006, 12). FEMA’s proactive response and 
coordination with states and local governments was positive as well as highlighted 
suggestions made by the NPR.  The agency’s performance in the aftermath of the 
earthquake demonstrated that it had transformed itself from a passive agency to a hard-
driving, problem solving organization with a much deeper commitment to serve its 
citizens (Johnston, 2000, 136).  In the late 1990s, FEMA faced several more natural 
disasters, including tornadoes, ice storms, hurricanes, floods, wildfires, and drought, but 
none were actually catastrophic in size or strength (Miskel, 2006, 86) and it responded 
positively since it was able to develop a national and regional cadre of skilled, dedicated 
emergency management specialists (Johnston, 2000, 136).   
Although the focus on preparedness allowed the agency to center on natural 
disaster, Congress in 1993 included a joint resolution in the National Defense 
Authorization Act (NDAA), calling on FEMA to develop an early detection and warning 
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system in response to potential terrorist use of chemical or biological agents or weapons 
(Cong. Rec., 1993, 22). Congressional concern was due in part to the 1993 bombing of 
the World Trade Center. In 1994, Congress repealed the Federal Civil Defense Act of 
1950 and all remnants of civil defense authority were transferred to Title VI of the 
Stafford Act. The end result was that civil defense was now included in the all-hazards 
approach to preparedness (DHS, 2007). The Oklahoma City bombing of 1995 
“represented the new phase in the evolution of emergency management,” raising the issue 
of America’s preparedness for terrorism events and shifting presidential and 
congressional attention back toward civil defense (Haddow and Bullock (2006, 11).  
These events tested FEMA and set the stage for interagency competition for control of 
terrorism. Instead of a resolution, the Nunn-Lugar legislation of 1995 left the question of 
implementation open, giving responsibility to the Department of Defense because it had 
the necessary knowledge and assets (Haddow and Bullock, 2006, 12).  According to 
Haddow and Bullock (2006), terrorism was part of the all-hazard approach to emergency 
management advocated by FEMA, even though they never took a leadership role as the 
first responder to a terrorism incident. Because both the resources and technologies 
needed to address issues such as biochemical warfare and weapons of mass destruction 
were far beyond the reach of FEMA, they deferred to others (Haddow and Bullock, 2006, 
12).  
In 1998, the gap in emergency management policies and practices led the United 
States Commission on National Security in the 21st Century to begin, “a comprehensive 
reexamination of the U.S. national security policies and processes in view of the changed 
international environment and technological, social, and intellectual changes of the late 
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20th Century” (Hogue and Bea, 2006, 19). Co-chaired by Senators Gary Hart (D-CO) and 
Warren B. Rudman (R-NH) and chartered by the Department of Defense, the committee 
(also known as the Hart-Rudman Commission), issued three reports between 1999 and 
February 2001. The reports had some fifty recommendations for governmental changes, 
ranging from revamping science and education, to the reorganization of the congress and 
its role in national security affairs (United States Commission on National Security/21st 
Century, 2001). Another recommendation included a proposal to create a Cabinet-level 
National Homeland Security Agency (NHSA). This agency would have responsibility for 
“planning, coordinating, and integrating various U.S. government activities involved in 
homeland security” (Bea 2002, 22).  FEMA was considered “a key building block in this 
effort” accompanied by three federal agencies “on the front line of border security”- the 
Coast Guard, the Customs Service, and the Border Patrol (United States Commission on 
National Security/21st Century, 2001). They envisioned the NHSA as having three 
directorates-Prevention, Critical Infrastructure, and Emergency Preparedness and 
Response (DHS, 2009). Legislation toward this end was introduced by Representative 
Mac Thornberry (R-TX), which held hearings but never reported a bill(Hogue and Bea, 
2006, 19).  
President George W. Bush reorganized FEMA in 2001 and appointed Joseph 
Allbaugh, who had no prior experience in disaster management, as the director. Allbaugh 
had been Bush’s chief of staff when he was Governor of Texas and the National 
Campaign Manager of Bush’s 2000 election campaign (Robert, 2006, 75). The Bush 
administration’s goal was to reorient the agency in a new direction by refocusing its 
efforts on civil defense and counterterrorism (Robert, 2006, 75). Meanwhile, the Office 
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of Management and Budget (OMB) emphasized three objectives for homeland security: 
counterterrorism, defense against WMD, and the protection of infrastructure (Robert, 
2006). To accomplish this goal, President Bush established a Counterterrorism and 
National Preparedness Policy Coordinating Committee composed of four working 
groups: Continuity of Federal Operations, Counterterrorism and Security, Preparedness 
and WMD, and Information Infrastructure Protection and Assurance (Robert, 2006, 77).  
President Bush directed Allbaugh to form the National Domestic Preparedness Office 
(NDPO) with the responsibility to “coordinate all federal programs dealing with weapons 
of mass destruction consequence management” (Allbaugh 2001, 1). In June 2001, 
Allbaugh announced the functional realignment of FEMA,  reporting that “the existing 
organization is not the best fit for the evolving mission of this agency nor does it support 
President Bush’s restructuring and streamlining goals” (Allbaugh 2001, 1). For Allbaugh, 
the proposed focus on weapons of mass destructions would adversely affect FEMA’s 
ability to respond to disaster.  
Even though Allbaugh sought to “flatten the organization where possible; reduce 
the number of organizations reporting directly to the office of the Director; and 
consolidate like functions” during the reorganization process, the functional realignment 
of FEMA created several new organizations, including the NDPO, and combined and 
modified other parts of the organization (Allbaugh, 2001, 1). Moreover, President Bush 
came to depend heavily on FEMA to address human-caused or technology-caused 
calamities as well as natural disasters (Burns, 2006, 19).  
Following the attacks of September 11, 2001, there was a near-universal 
consensus within the federal government that homeland security required a major 
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reassessment, increased funding, and administrative reorganization. In October 8, 2001, 
President Bush established the Office of Homeland Security via Executive Order 13228 
to “work with Executive Departments and agencies to develop and coordinate the 
implementation of a comprehensive national strategy to secure the United States from 
terrorist threats and attacks”(DHS, 2006, 4). This directive placed the Office of 
Homeland Security within the Executive Office of the President and made the Director 
the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security. President Bush chose Pennsylvania 
Governor Tom Ridge to lead the new office (DHS, 2006, 4).  
During his 2002 State of the Union Address, President Bush announced the 
creation of the USA Freedom Corps to promote a culture of service, citizenship, and 
responsibility in America (White House, 2002). Under the Freedom Corps initiative, the 
White House established the Citizen Corps within FEMA to “engage individual citizens 
through education, training, and volunteer service to make communities better prepared 
to prevent, protect, respond, and recover from all hazards” (DHS, 2006, 8). Along the 
same line, President Bush in March 2002 established another executive order-13260-
creating the Homeland Security Advisory Council to advise the President on Homeland 
Security matters (White House, 2003). 
On March 12, 2002, the Homeland Security Advisory System (HSAS) was 
created to communicate with the American public and safety officials using a threat-
based color system, so protective measures could be implemented to reduce the 
likelihood or impact of an attack (DHS, 2006). According to the Homeland Security 
National Preparedness Task Force (2006), the Bush Administration also developed a 
number of strategic documents and statements that outlined the President’s vision for 
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protecting the nation. Those strategies included the National Security Strategy, the 
National Strategy for Homeland Security (NSHS), and the National Strategy to Combat 
Weapons of Mass Destruction (Homeland Security National Preparedness Task Force, 
2006, 26). As these strategies were being developed, Congress pushed for more 
substantial reorganization of the Federal agencies involved in Homeland Security while 
the President submitted his own plan for the creation of a homeland security department 
on June 6, 2002 (Kettl, 2004, 20). The September 11, 2001 attacks and actions taken by 
President Bush with the acquiescence of Congress, shifted disaster relief attention to civil 
defense and more precisely as a matter of national security.  
 After intense debate, Congress passed the Homeland Security Act of 2002 
(HSA), which established the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), including the 
Emergency Preparedness and Response (EPR) Directorate (CRS, 2005). Title V of HSA 
transferred the functions, personnel, resources, and authority of six existing entities, the 
largest of which was FEMA, into EPR (CRS, 2005). Meanwhile, section 507 of HSA 
specifically charged FEMA with “carrying out its mission to reduce the loss of life and 
property and protect the Nation from all hazards by leading and supporting the nation in a 
comprehensive, risk-based emergency management program” (Vina, 2002, 3).  These 
supplemental requirements added bureaucratic layers to the flow of emergency 
information as well as disrupted the organizational chart of the agency (Schneider, 2006). 
Despire the fact that FEMA was transferred into DHS, “it was not defined as an 
autonomous or distinct entity within its parent organization” (Hogue and Bea, 2006, 20). 
Although the initial work of the department focused on addressing the threat of domestic 
terrorism, the DHS mandate encompassed the full range of disasters and attacks (Hogue 
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and Bea, 2006, 20). Within this perspective, all-hazards preparedness soon became a top 
priority, albeit a priority with a focus on terrorism. 
In January 2003, the President named Tom Ridge as the first Secretary of the 
DHS. Ridge obtained increased budgetary authority and control over many of the 
agencies involved in homeland security (Cong. Rec., 2006, 55). The DHS inherited 
approximately 200,000 employees from 22 federal agencies and an initial budget of $37 
billion (DHS, 2006). On March 1, 2003, FEMA’s functions were transferred to the DHS. 
Secretary Ridge used his reorganization authority to consolidate organizational units and 
reallocate functions within DHS. Some of the changes such as select grant under Section 
502 and 503 of the Homeland Security Act were consolidated within the Office of State 
and Local Government Coordination and Preparedness, an office that would report 
directly to the Secretary (DHS, 2004). In December 2003, Homeland Security 
Presidential Directive-8: National Preparedness (HSPD-8) was issued. The directive 
defined preparedness as encompassing, “threatened or actual domestic terrorist attacks, 
major disasters, and other emergencies” (Homeland Security National Preparedness Task 
Force, 2006, 28).  With this broad directive, the DHS assessed how federal, state, local, 
tribal, and private sector resources worked together to address emergencies. The 
assessment led to the development of a new National Response Plan (NRP) and the 
National Incident Management System (NIMS) (Homeland Security National 
Preparedness Task Force, 2006, 28).  The NRP was designed to establish framework for 
how federal agencies would interact with each other and with state, local and tribal 
governments, and also with the private sector and nongovernment organizations. This 
plan defines and specifies roles and responsibilities for domestic incident prevention, 
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preparedness, mitigation, response, and recovery activities (Goodman, et al., 2007, 267). 
The NIMS ensures that all level of government works from the same playbook during a 
disaster. It main principle is one incident, one commander, no matter how many agencies 
send help (Cooper and Block, 2007, 278).  The federal government requires local 
government to adopt NIMS in order to be eligible for federal preparedness grant.   
FEMA’s organizational components (especially preparedness) came to the 
forefront under Ridge’s successor Michael Chertoff. Before joining DHS, Chertoff served 
as judge on the Third Circuit Court of Appeals. Upon taking office in February 2005, 
Chertoff initiated a systematic evaluation of the Department’s operations, policies and 
structures (DHS, 2005). This initiative, known as the Second Stage Review (2SR)  
resulted in a six-point agenda: (1) to increase preparedness with a focus on catastrophic 
events; (2) to strengthen border security and interior enforcement and reform immigration 
processes; (3) to harden transportation security without sacrificing mobility; (4) to 
enhance information sharing with U.S. government and private sector partners; (5) to 
improve DHS financial human resources, procurement, and information technology 
management; and finally (6) to realign the DHS’s organization to maximize mission 
performance (Homeland Security National Preparedness Task Force, 2006,30). The goal 
of this six-point agenda was to increase the DHS’s ability to prepare, prevent, and 
respond to terrorist attacks and other emergencies.  The DHS’s agenda focused primarily 
on terrorism/civil defense to the exclusion of natural disasters. This review also resulted 
in the creation of a new Directorate of Preparedness (DP). Most functions originally 
housed in the EPR Directorate were transferred to this new directorate. Meanwhile, the 
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remaining components of EPR and FEMA focused on response and recovery, and not on 
preparation (CRS-Report RL 33064).  
According to Hogue and Bea (2006, 21), Chertoff’s implementation of the 
reorganization proposal was not universally accepted. The National Emergency 
Management Association (NEMA), composed of state and county level emergency 
directors, criticized the proposed reorganization. The association noted that it would be a 
mistake to separate disaster planning from response. In the midst of all these concerns, 
Congress approved the division of responsibility of CEM functions but did not enact the 
legislation to change the structure of FEMA (Hogue and Bea 2006, 22). It addressed the 
Administration’s reorganization plan during the FY 2006 appropriation process, which 
was underway at the time Chertoff’s initiative was announced (Hogue and Bea 2006, 22).  
Since Congress did not enact legislation to change the structure of FEMA, 
Director Michael Brown, who took office in 2003, held the title of Under Secretary for 
Federal Emergency Management and reported directly to the Secretary (Hogue and Bea 
2006, 22). He oversaw three divisions (Response, Mitigation, and Recovery), ten regional 
offices, and numerous other components (GAO, 2006, 614). In addition, emergency 
preparedness functions were vested in DP, which he also headed with no experience in 
emergency management (Miskel, 2006, 30). By shifting many preparedness tasks to the 
DP, the Bush Administration left FEMA as a response agency for rescue and clean-up 
(Shane, 2005).  
The fears expressed about FEMA’s separation of disaster planning from response 
came true once Hurricane Katrina, a Category Three storm, struck the Gulf Coast on 
August 28, 2005. Katrina made landfall in Southeast Louisiana and the Louisiana-
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Mississippi border, causing severe and catastrophic damage all along the Gulf Coast. The 
storm destroyed the cities of Bay St. Louis, Waveland, and Biloxi/Gulfport in Mississippi 
as well as Mobile, Alabama, and Slidell, Louisiana (Miskel, 2006, 94). The levees that 
separated Lake Pontchartrain and several canals from New Orleans were breached a few 
days later, flooding eighty percent of the city and many areas of neighboring parishes for 
weeks (Freedberg and Syndney, 2005, 3). An estimated 1,836 people lost their lives in 
Hurricane Katrina and subsequent floods, making it the deadliest U.S. hurricane since the 
1928 Okeechobee Hurricane (Miskel, 2006, 94). In addition, the storm is estimated to 
have been responsible for $81.2 billion in damage, making it the costliest national 
disaster in U.S. history (Miskel, 2006, 95). Under the leadership of Michael Brown, 
FEMA performed miserably during Hurricane Katrina.  
Major problems developed during the governmental response to Katrina largely 
because emergency management officials at the local, state, and federal levels did not 
follow federal guidelines, procedures and processes (Schneider, 2007, 1). For example, 
the ODP, whose duty is to pay exclusive attention to state and local first responders such 
as police officers, firefighters, and emergency medical personnel, failed to communicate 
and coordinate response teams. Since ODP money could only be used for terrorism 
preparedness, emergency managers, local officials, and first responders in Louisiana and 
Mississippi could not access funds for natural disaster preparedness (Miskel, 2006, 98). 
According to Schneider (2007, 9), FEMA exemplified several “bureaucratic pathologies” 
during the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. Ambiguous mission and personnel problems, 
faltering mobilization, bureaucratic rigidity, and red tape all contributed to FEMA’s poor 
response (Schneider, 2007, 12-20). Hurricane Katrina revealed FEMA’s weak 
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organizational structure and leadership. In regard to disaster relief policy, Hurricane 
Katrina shifted the attention back to natural disasters. Therefore, this tragedy brings back 
how disaster relief policy should be defined in the United States. 
 
Conclusion 
 The preceding indicates that the history of civil defense and natural disaster 
involves myriad policy and organizational changes. Those changes have been driven by a 
variety of factors: (1) potential nuclear attacks, (2) devastating natural and man-made 
disasters, (3) congressional mandates, and (4) the specific preferences of presidential 
administrations. As a punctuating event, Hurricane Katrina shifted and challenged the 
policy process, actors, organizations, and institutions.  Following its aftermath, 
committees in both chambers of Congress and the Bush Administration conducted 
investigations into governmental failures during the preparation for and response to 
disaster. While DHS conducted an internal review and the White House assessed the role 
of governmental response to Hurricane Katrina, Congress introduced legislation and held 
hearings that dealt with disaster relief policy.  Since congressional committees serve as 
the legislative anchor for the subsystem, the following chapters map how they govern the 
agenda of disaster relief policy over the post-war era.  
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Chapter Four 
 
Tracking Agenda Status 
The preceding chapters discuss the historical development of disaster relief in the 
U.S., and how this development vacillates between two fronts: civil defense and natural 
disasters.  Given that disasters are unpredictable with respect both to their occurrence and 
their outcome, the government is left in a predicament about whether to act, when to act, 
and what action to take to manage these disasters (Birkland, 1997; McEntire, 1998; Dara 
et al. 2005).  This chapter seeks to understand this shift by focusing on bill introductions 
as the first of two ways in which Congress governs the agenda of disaster relief over the 
post-war era. The purpose of this chapter is three-fold. First, I develop an indicator of the 
institutional agenda by examining the ebb and flow of bill introductions in both the 
House and the Senate over the post-war period in the policy areas of natural disaster and 
civil defense. I provide a snapshot of the overall level of activity, as well as highlight 
periods of increased salience in both policy areas. Second, I examine the composition of 
legislation in an effort to decipher the topics that receive attention and the shift in issue 
framing. Third, I examine the referral of legislation to highlight the dynamics of policy 
jurisdiction.  Examining referrals enables one to identify not only committee competition, 
but also highlight periods of policy monopoly.   
For ease of presentation, I break this mapping down into three sections--- civil 
defense, disaster relief, and a conclusion that compares the two. Each section is guided by 
three questions: “When did the issue get on the agenda?” “What facet of the issue 
receives attention?” and   “Who exercises jurisdictional control?” 
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Civil Defense Bill Introductions, 1946-2005
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4.1. Mapping the Civil Defense Agenda  
The data on legislative introductions were gathered using the Congressional Bills 
Project, as well as the THOMAS search engine.  Concurrent, joint resolutions, and public 
bills were included in the counts. The Congressional Bills Project data were gathered 
under two broad categories: civil defense and homeland security. The database specified 
the examples of categories as “radiological emergency planning,” “civil reserve air fleet,” 
“federal civil defense act,”   “effect of limited nuclear warfare,” “federal fallout shelter 
construction,” “ civil defense air raid shelter program,” “ civil defense for national 
survival,” and “ civil air patrol.”  A THOMAS subject search using the key term “civil 
defense” and “Homeland Security and related functions” was conducted in order to 
double check bills introduced between 1973 and 2005.   
The civil defense search produced 298 bills introduced between 1947 and 2005 
(171 in the House and 127 in the Senate).   
Figure 4.1: Number of House and Senate Bills Introduced on the subject of Civil 
Defense from 1947-2005 
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Figure 4.1 indicates that interest in the issue has lessened over time and across the 
House and the Senate. There has been more activity in the House than in the Senate, and 
the patterns of activity across both chambers have also differed. Interest in the House 
grows at a steady pace and peaks in 1957, 1963, 1977 and 2004. The sharp peak in 1953 
could be explained by President Eisenhower’s decision to support a mass evacuation 
policy instead of a shelter program initiated under the Truman administration. Partly 
responsible for the increase was the denotation of a hydrogen bomb by the Soviet Union 
in 1953, which renewed congressional attention to civil defense matters.  The interest as 
it relates to the jump seems to be associated with congressional intent to establish a 
civilian department within the Department of Defense, known as the Department of Civil 
Defense, to provide stockpiling, storage, and distribution of food supply to the civilian 
population that would be evacuated from the devastated areas in the event of an attack on 
the U.S. Unlike the House, the peak in Senate activity occurred in early 1953.  The 
activity surge appears to coincide with the passing of the Federal Civil Defense Act of 
1950 that allocated significant funding for shelter initiatives. The Senate activity, 
however, decreased after 1953 and regained a peak in 2005 following the attacks of 
September 11, 2001.  
The increase in activity in the House in 1977 coincides with the amendment of the 
Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950. The act allocated significant funding for shelter 
initiative and placed the majority of the civil defense responsibilities on individual states. 
The peak in 1979 prompted by the accident at the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant 
corresponds with congressional demands that various civil defense agencies be combined 
into one coherent agency in direct contact with the White House.  There is a virtual 
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absence of civil defense bills between 1991 and 1999, associated with the end of the Cold 
War. 
Civil defense again became prominent on the agenda corresponding with the 
attacks of September 11, 2001. This increase in legislative activity in both chambers is no 
doubt a product of the attack and produced the Homeland Security Act, which established 
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), as well as the Emergency Preparedness 
and Response (EPR) directorate.  
To try to approximate the dimension of attention civil defense receives, I have 
developed a coding system based on bill titles and or summary remarks found in the 
Congressional Bills Project and THOMAS.  In view of the two broad categories, civil 
defense and homeland security, bills coded Aid include legislation dealing with 
appropriations for civil defense programs. Defense includes legislation that discusses the 
establishment of a Federal Department of Civil Defense and other purposes.  Insurance 
includes legislation that discusses provisions/compensation to states and local 
government in case of an attack, miscalculation or accident. Shelter contains legislation 
that specifically seeks to address efforts to minimize casualties.  Nuclear includes 
legislation that discusses the study of special civil defense needs in areas which contain 
significant elements of the United States’ strategic nuclear retaliatory forces. Air Patrol 
includes legislation that discusses the establishment of a civil air patrol as a civilian 
auxiliary. Radiological contains legislation that seeks to address the purchase by the 
Federal Civil Defense Administrator of certain radiological detection instruments, 
devices, and equipments. I chose these search terms to reflect the names of the categories 
that appeared in the database.  
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Figure 4.2 (House) and Figure 4.3 (Senate), explore the answer to the second 
main research question: “What facet of the issue receives attention?”  
Figure 4.2: Civil Defense Bill Content: House 
            
From 1947 to 1951, aid, air patrol, and defense received modest attention in these 
immediate years following World War II. For the most part, in the House, most of the 
civil defense related proposals centered on defense. Also in the House there seems to be 
no attention to any particular issue in 1995. This is no surprise, since September 11, 
2001, renewed attention considering mix of issues.  In 2003, during the 108th Congress, 
there is a slight shift in attention from defense to the topics of aid and insurance. Such a 
shift is indicative of the damages incurred during 9/11.  
Figure 4.3: Civil Defense Bill Content: Senate 
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An examination of figure 4.3 suggests that between 1947 and 1959, the Senate 
deals with a mix of issues similar to those of the House. The chart in figure 4.3 shows an 
increase from 1947 reaching a peak in 1953, and the beginning of a decline in 1956. Civil 
Defense disappears on the Senate agenda in 1963, picking up again in 1975. The issue 
was non-existent on the Senate agenda, and also absent on the President’s agenda, which 
is consistent with the President’s role in setting the foreign policy agenda. Upon his 
assumption of office following Kennedy’s assassination, President Johnson marked the 
beginning of his administration by dramatically cutting back funding of the nation’s civil 
defense program. The cutback in funding not only affected the continuation of the 
program, but civil defense issues also began to fall slowly from the institutional radar. 
Typical of this lack of interest was the administration’s refusal to pressure Congress to 
pass the Shelter Incentive Program, which proposed to provide every non-profit 
institution with financial compensation for each shelter it built.  
The Nixon administration redefined civil defense policy to include preparedness 
for natural disasters.  The redefined civil defense policy continued under the Ford, Carter, 
Reagan, Bush and Clinton administrations enshrined in the “dual-use preparedness 
approach” in which civil defense funding could be used for natural disaster mitigation 
and preparedness.  
Between 1995 and 2001 the issue dropped off the agenda, and then received a 
surge of attention following 9/11. The surge is associated with the pressing concern with 
counter-terrorism as was the case in the House. It is worth noting that from 1946 until the 
end of the analysis period, insurance is not addressed in the Senate. This might be due to 
the broader discussion of disaster relief policy.  
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Three observations stand out. First, the focus over time is one in which defense 
dominates the discussion. Second, an increase in bill introduction activity is associated 
with a more varied discussion. Third, the increase in bill introductions in 2003 is 
associated with a mixture of concerns on the agenda in both chambers. This can partly be 
explained by the salient event of 9/11 and the attention given to it by the two chambers.  
Having observed how civil defense got on the institutional agenda, the next 
question to examine is “Who exercises jurisdictional control?” Bill referrals are both a 
means of maintaining control as well as a means of expanding jurisdiction (Worsham, 
1997, 70). As King (1997) has documented, controlling referrals is essential to preserving 
turf. Figures 4.4 and 4.5, map the referral of legislation in both the House and Senate. 
Figure 4.4: House Civil Defense Bill Referral: Committee Competition 
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Figure 4.5: Senate Civil Defense Bill Referral: Committee Competition 
 
A review of figures 4.4 and 4.5 reveals that the civil defense policy domain in 
both chambers conforms to the traditional dominant coalition scenario at times, with 
periods of competition in the 1950s and the 1960s. As the destination of legislation in the 
House, the Armed Services committee in 1950s and 1960s experienced competition in 
which the Interior Committee, the Judiciary Committee, the Government Operation 
Committee and Ways and Means act as rival venues. Most of the proposals during this 
competition questioned the U.S. civil defense preparedness emergency management. By 
1971, competition in the House is non-existent, indicating the decline in the level of 
attention. 
 Like in the House, the Armed Services Committee in the Senate encounters 
competition in the 1950s and 1960s, when some legislation is referred to the Public 
Works Committee. This competition remains until 1965, when legislation is referred to 
additional committees such as Banking, Judiciary, and Interior. However, competition 
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vanishes after 1968 with sporadic appearance in 1977 and 1980. In addition, attention to 
the issue disappears completely in the periods 1968 through 1974 and 1993 through 2001 
It appears that the creation of FEMA, the provisions of 1980, the 1988 Robert T. 
Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, the 2000 Disaster Mitigation 
Act, and the attacks of September 11, 2001, all function as a shock to the system. In some 
measure, we see that these interruptions are reflective of negative feedback because the 
initial disruption becomes smaller as it works its way through time (Baumgartner and 
Jones 1993, 6). Besides a minor degree of competition, the Armed Services Committee in 
both chambers is the dominant venue for referrals throughout the epoch under study.  To 
reinforce the argument of a policy monopoly being secured by the Armed Services 
committee, figures 4.4 and 4.5 present a Herfindahl index score of each chamber.  
A Herfindahl index score is calculated by squaring the proportion of committees 
holding referrals in the policy realm and then summing the squares of those proportions. 
The result is an index score that ranges from zero to one. A score close to zero indicates 
referrals are spread out among a large number of committee, while a score of one 
indicates that a single committee holds all the referrals (Worsham, 2004). Indices were 
constructed for each year in order to offer a longitudinal measure of referral competition 
in both chambers. As figures 4.4 and 4.5 reveal, both chambers exhibit periods of perfect 
monopoly.  
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Figure 4.6: House Herfindahl Index: Turf Monopoly 
 
Figure 4.7: Senate Herfindahl Index: Turf Monopoly 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 At the macro-level, we can conclude that the level of attention to civil defense and 
the degree of committee competition was at its apex from 1947 to 1965.  The decline in 
the level of attention and committee competition over the next decades ushers the end of 
the Cold War and the introduction of intensive precautionary measures during the 
aftermath of a disaster. In the following section, I turn my attention to the natural disaster 
agenda and compare its patterns of activity to that of civil defense.   
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Natural Disaster Bill Introductions, 1947-2005
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4.2. Mapping the Natural Disaster Agenda 
As was the case for civil defense, the data on legislative introductions were 
gathered using the Congressional Bills Project as well as the THOMAS search engine.  
The Congressional Bills Project data were gathered under one main category-Domestic 
Disaster Relief.  The database specified examples of the main category of Domestic 
Disaster Relief as “aid for flood disasters,” “national flood insurance reform,” 
“earthquake preparedness,” “FEMA disaster planning and relief operations,” “FEMA 
national fire academy training programs,” “SBA disaster loans, interest rate on disaster 
loans,” “emergency credit extension to farmers in disaster areas,” “hurricane protection 
projects,” “drought relief,” “establishment of a national fire academy.” A THOMAS 
subject search using the key term “disaster” was conducted in order to double check bills 
introduced between 1973 and 2005 of the Congressional Bills Project.   
The search produced 1,701 bills, 1,252 in the House and 449 in the Senate. Figure 
4.8 tracks the number of bills introduced on the subject of disaster relief.  
Figure 4.8: Number of House and Senate Bills Introduced on the subject of Natural 
Disaster from 1947-2005 
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As figure 4.8 indicates, disaster relief emerges on the agenda of both chambers 
after 1947.  By 1955, the frequency of bill introduction on natural disaster increased in 
both chambers. That attention is coupled with the passing of the 1956 Federal Flood 
Insurance Act that provides federal disaster relief insurance and reinsurance. The Senate 
experienced a gradual decline in 1963 but rose gradually between 1965 and 1971. As 
compared to the Senate, activity in the House remains relatively active for the next five 
years. This surge of activity in the 1960s corresponds with the shift from viewing disaster 
as an Act of God to a nonstructural mitigation; thus, denoting the use of wetlands to 
buffer against flooding as well as the use of landscaping to protect structures from 
flooding or wildfires (Sylves, 2008, 51). This shift in view is also due in part to the series 
of flooding in California, Oregon, Washington, Nevada and hurricanes in Florida, 
Louisiana and Mississippi. In addition, the surge in activity might be attributed to 
President Nixon’s administration’s poor performance in the aftermath of Hurricane 
Camille in August 1969 (Sylves, 2008, 52).  
  The flow of Congressional activities in 1973 concurs with the series of 
devastating tornadoes that hit six Midwestern States. This stream of activities echoed the 
need to add individual and family assistance to the disaster relief program. This 
consideration was coupled with the passing of the Disaster Relief Act of 1974.  This 
expanded relief assistance to individual disaster victims, offered assistance for the 
reconstruction of public facilities, and authorized the President to provide economic 
recovery assistance after the period of emergency aid and replacement of essential 
facilities and services. Although Congress passed the Disaster Relief Act of 1974, it 
never funded it and the act was repealed in 1998 (Bea, 2005).  
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By passing the Disaster Relief Act of 1974, Congress advocated a multi-hazard, 
or an all hazard approach, to emergency management, thus signaling the diminution of 
civil defense issues, funding, and concerns in the realm of domestic emergency 
management. This decrease of attention in civil defense continued for twenty more years 
until the Federal Civil Defense Act was repealed in 1994 (Sylves, 2008). By repealing the 
Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950, all remnants of civil defense authority were 
transferred to Title VI of the Stafford Act. The Stafford Act gave FEMA the 
responsibility to coordinate a comprehensive emergency preparedness system for all 
types of disasters. In addition, Title VI ended all Armed Services Committee oversight 
over FEMA and the money authorized by the Civil Defense Act was reallocated to 
natural disaster and all hazard programs (Sylves, 2008).  
The Senate bill introductions follow a slightly different pattern than the House.  
From 1975 to 1999, Senate legislative activities declined steadily, while the House 
experienced fluctuations in the sense that its activities declined slightly in 1987, but 
increased in 1993 before then decreasing in 1995. The House activities continued to 
fluctuate until 2000. The Senate’s lack of activities between 1979 and 1989 reflect their 
concern about the use of disaster authority for responding to non-natural disaster or 
emergencies, such as managing the Cuban refugee influx and the Three Mile Island 
incident (Figure 3.6),  (Haddow and Bullock, 2006, 6). This ebb and flow of activity in 
both chambers reflect the public outrage over the 1978 Three Mile Island Incident, the 
creation of the Federal Emergency Management Agency in 1979,  the 1988 Robert T. 
Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, and finally the 2000 Disaster 
Mitigation Act. After FEMA’s poor response in the aftermath of disasters that occurred 
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between 1989 and 1999, congressional activities did not increase radically. Bills 
introduced in both chambers during this time period centered on the reorganization of 
FEMA. It is not until the end of the 1999 that we see a noticeable surge in legislative 
activities. This surge overlaps with the passing of the Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000, 
which modifies the Stafford Act by establishing a national program for pre-disaster 
mitigation, streamlining administration of disaster relief, and controlling federal costs of 
disaster assistance. Clearly, the extraordinary level of attention in both chambers between 
2001 and 2003 is attributed to the aftermath of the attacks of September 11, 2001. 
Following the attacks of September 11, 2001, there is a near-universal agreement 
within both chambers that homeland security required a major re-assessment, an increase 
in funding, and an administrative reorganization (Allbaugh, 2001, 1). The peak in 
activities in both chambers mirror the push for more substantial reorganization of the 
federal agencies involved in Homeland Security. This increase relates to the passing of 
the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (HAS), which establishes the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) including the Emergency Preparedness and Response (EPR) 
Directorate.  In 2003, FEMA became part of DHS and in July 12, 2005, DHS was 
reorganized with FEMA as an independent agency within the Department. Given 
FEMA’s poor performance during and in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina in August 
2005, it is reasonable to see an increase in legislative activities. 
To determine which area of natural disaster receives attention, I developed a 
coding instrument by coding legislation based on bill titles and or summary remarks 
found in the Congressional Bills Project and THOMAS. Bills coded insurance includes 
legislation dealing with provisions for national insurance for victims of natural disasters. 
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Earthquake includes legislation that discusses existing building and infrastructure 
structures, which protect occupants against seismic forces. Fire, Snowstorms, Hurricane, 
Flood, Tornado, and Drought legislation discusses damages and assistance measures for 
affected peoples.  Aid includes legislation that discusses response plans of states and local 
government affected by natural disasters. Loans contain legislation that addresses 
government financed loans to help not only small businesses, but also individuals, 
businesses of all sizes and nonprofits reestablish after a natural disaster.  
Figures 4.9 (House) and Figure 4.10 (Senate) illustrate the topics that receive 
attention on the agenda in both chambers.  
Figure 4.9: Natural Disaster Bill Content: House 
 
A review of Figure 4.9 and 4.10 show that for the most part, both chambers place 
attention on a mix of issues. Evident in both chambers, insurance issues dominate the 
natural disaster agenda between 1963 and 1987. This is indicative of the overlapping 
funding of civil defense and natural disaster in the policy domain. Despite the disastrous 
magnitude of Hurricane Katrina, there is a slight increase of attention to the subject of 
hurricane and flooding in both chambers.  
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Natural Disaster Bill Content: Senate
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Figure 4.10: Natural Disaster Bill Content: Senate 
 
In essence, as Figures 4.9 and 4.10 indicate, the study time frame is characterized by an 
increase in issue topics, with insurance receiving the majority of attention.  
 Overall, in both chambers, legislative introductions associated with natural 
disaster policy appear to follow a cycle. Four observations stand out. First, the modest 
increase of activities focus on preventive measures. Second, the increase of activities 
surrounding bill introduction activity in both chambers are associated with the end of the 
Cold War, as well as the debate over flooding as an Act of God or man-induced. Third, 
the slight surge of bill introductions especially in the House coincide with the demand for 
the coordination of disaster response, FEMA. And finally, the abrupt decline of bill 
introductions is associated with a diversion toward issues related to counter-terrorism. 
Having mapped the disaster relief agenda, the following figure examines the issue of 
jurisdictional control.  
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Figure 4.11: House Natural Disaster Bill Referral: Committee Competition 
 
A review of figures 4.11 and 4.12 reveal that the policy domain of natural disaster 
in both chambers reflects a competitive coalition scenario. Not a single committee is the 
primary venue as the destination of legislation.  Fifteen committees in the House and a 
dozen in the Senate are regular players in the policy realm, with competition the norm 
during any particular year.   
Figure 4.12: Senate Natural Disaster Bill Referral: Committee Competition 
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To reinforce the argument that the policy domain experiences competition, Figure 
4.13 and 4.14 present a Herfindahl index score of each chamber.  
 
Figure 4.13: House Herfindahl Index: Turf Monopoly 
 
 
As illustrated by figures 4.13 and 4.14, referral of natural disaster proposals 
resides within the jurisdiction of various committees. For example, the Senate with a Herf 
score below .3 is a reflection of intense competition.  
 
Figure 4:14: Senate Herfindahl Index: Turf Monopoly 
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So far, I have established that not a single committee maintains a policy 
monopoly over the referral of introduction throughout most of the period of analysis. 
Also, competition arises as disaster serves as shocks to the system. As such, to examine 
how the frame of disaster relief policy shifts, the two dominant images are thus 
compared.  
 
Comparison of the two dominant images of disaster relief 
 After mapping the civil defense and natural disaster agendas, it is clear that the 
image of disaster relief has shifted in the U.S. between 1946 and 2005.  When comparing 
the number of bills introduced on both topics (figure 4.15), the House focuses primarily 
on natural disaster issues, while civil defense issues are barely noticeable. This attention 
to natural disaster corresponds with punctuating events such as Hurricane Camille (1969), 
Hurricane Agnes (1972), the Great Midwest Flood (1993) and the Northridge Earthquake 
(1994).  
Figure 4.15: House Bills Introductions of Natural Disaster and Civil Defense 
 
House Bill Introductions for Natural Disaster and Civil Defense, 1947-2005
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On the other hand, the Senate (figure 4.16), focuses primarily on civil defense issues 
while natural disaster issues are virtually absent. The Senate attention to civil defense 
does not necessarily correlate with punctuating events, except in the case of the 9/11 
attacks. For example, the peak in 1974 is associated with the debate regarding an all-
hazards approach to emergency management. 
Figure 4.16: Senate Bills Introductions of Natural Disaster and Civil Defense
 
 Senate Bill Introductions for Natural Disaster and Civil Defense, 1947-2005
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 Three explanations may account for the above observations. First, given that state 
and local governments are first responders to disasters, governors, congressional 
representatives, and policymakers, have to ensure that sizeable federal resources are 
allocated to their state for post-disaster redevelopment (Sylves, 2008). Second, when it 
comes to wartime threats to national security, Larson et al. (2001) argue that the Senate 
has always taken the lead in the matter because it has to address its budgetary aggregate. 
Third, media attention, budget data and presidential attention could possibly explain the 
shift in attention and salience in each policy domain. To further explore these 
observations, I conducted a comparison between the series and ran a correlation by 
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tracking bill introductions and presidential attention. Presidential attention is measured by 
counting the number of times Presidents mention “civil defense” and “natural disaster’ in 
their State of the Union Address.  
 
Figure 4.17: Bill Introductions and Presidential State of the Union: Natural Disaster 
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Figure 4.18: Bill Introductions and Presidential State of the Union: Civil Defense 
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  Figures 4.17 and 4.18 compare bill introductions and Presidential State of the 
Union Addresses between the time series. The Pearson correlation for each time series.09 
in the case of natural disasters and .1 for civil defense, suggest no relationship between 
bill introductions and presidential attention in either domain.  
Overall, based on the above congressional activities, when it comes to disaster 
relief, it is understandable why FEMA, an agency created to handle natural disaster, and 
transferred in 2003 to the Department of Homeland Security (with an emphasis on 
counterterrorism), performed poorly in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. As the review 
of figures above illustrates, Congress seems to shift the image of disaster relief as it 
encounters them.  
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Conclusion 
This chapter documented the issues on the civil defense and natural disaster 
agendas that receive attention, and where jurisdictional control and committee 
competition reside. Throughout the analysis defense was the main issue on the civil 
defense agenda. In the later-1950s throughout the early 1960s, attention to civil defense 
peaked, and slightly decreased in the next twenty-three years. However, after the attacks 
of September 11, 2001, the level of attention increased to some extent. The resulting 
diversity of issues on the agenda---defense, shelter, insurance, nuclear, air patrol and 
radiological---provided the Armed Services Committee the opportunity to guide the civil 
defense. Unlike civil defense, natural disaster illustrated an overall increase in activity. 
Once disaster emerged, a mix of issues comprised the agenda, not to mention the 
presence of committee competition. In Congress, natural disaster bill referrals usually 
involved competition, while the civil defense realm displayed more of the features of a 
policy monopoly.  
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Chapter Five 
 
Dissecting Disaster Relief Agenda Setting and Efforts of Issue Redefinition 
 
 
 The previous chapter suggests that noticeable changes in the disaster relief agenda 
as measured by bill introductions occur as a result of punctuating events.  This chapter is 
the second step in exploring and assessing the agenda of disaster relief policy through the 
examination of legislative hearings. This analysis includes both legislative and non-
legislative hearings. Even though legislative hearings are important to agenda setting, 
non-legislative hearings are also significant to the process because they enable 
committees to frame or alter the definition of policy issues outside of their jurisdiction 
(Talbert, Jones, and Baumgartner, 1995, 384).  There are three particular elements I will 
explore in this chapter concerning the disaster relief agenda. 
 First, I want to assess the overall level of hearing activity in both the House and 
the Senate. Similar to bill introductions, this chapter provides a general understanding of 
the level of attention Congress gives to disaster relief policy. This longitudinal approach 
is beneficial because it highlights whether a change in activity corresponds to a particular 
“punctuating event.” Kingdon (1984) asserts that such focusing events are important 
because they have the potential to influence the overall institutional agenda.  
 Second, I will explore the dynamics of policy jurisdiction and policy monopoly. 
Identifying the committees that hold hearings tells something about the nature of disaster 
policy turf, allowing me to highlight periods of competition and monopoly in both policy 
streams in each chamber.  
74 
 
Third, picking up on an observation by Birkland (1998), who discussed how 
focusing events affect and shape policy communities, I will develop a coding instrument 
with the intent to approximate the multiple dimensions of disaster relief policy.   
Data Collection 
 Like other studies that track agenda entrance by focusing on congressional 
activity, I focus on congressional hearings in this chapter. Hearings can include efforts of 
issue redefinition as well as attempts to maintain the status quo (Hunt, 2002; Tzoumia, 
2001; Baumgartner and Jones, 1993). Prior research suggests that hearings are a key 
method by which Congress gathers policy information. By examining hearings in an 
aggregate form over time, one is able to identify pertinent differences in the set of 
interests active on a particular issue (Hardin, 2002; Sabatier and Jenkins Smith, 1993). 
Utilizing the Congressional Information Service Index to Committee Hearings and 
Abstracts on Committee Hearings, I was able to identify hearings dealing with disaster 
relief policy between 1954 and 2007. In order to capture the swing between natural 
disaster and civil defense, I conducted two searches. After consulting the “index terms” 
function of the Congressional Index Service, the search terms “disasters,” “drought,” 
“earthquake,” “fires and fire prevention,” “floods,” “storms,” and “tornadoes” were used 
to identify hearings (and committees) that deal with natural disasters. In order to locate 
hearings dealing with civil defense policy, I used terms such as “civil defense,” “Civil 
Defense Advisory Council,” “Federal Civil Defense Administration,” “Office of Civil 
Defense,” and “homeland security. ” 
  The initial search produced close to 4000 hearings. After eliminating 
appropriations hearings and other hearings which did not actually deal with natural 
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disasters or civil defense, I was left with a total of 3571 hearings—2109 in the House and 
1462 in the Senate. The case of the House involved 1506 focused on natural disasters and 
604 dealing with civil defense. The search of Senate produced 1005 focused on natural 
disasters and 457 dealing with civil defense.  
5.1. Mapping Hearing Activity 
 A review of figures 5.1 through 5.4 reveal several features of disaster relief 
policy. Not surprisingly, until the events of September 2001, natural disasters occupied 
more congressional space than does the discussion of civil defense (figures 5.1 and 5.2). 
The obvious aside, the attention to civil defense in the House and Senate are strongly 
correlated. Attention peaks in both chambers in 1950 and is focused on atomic energy, 
and the attendant fallout dealing with bomb shelters makes civil defense somewhat 
topical throughout the 1960. Interesting is the lack of focus on the events surrounding the 
Cuban Missile Crisis in the House, despite the spike of attention in the Senate. Following 
that spike in attention, hearing activity drops off to a mere trickle through most of 2001. 
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Figure 5.1: House, Disaster Relief Policy 1945-2005
 
Figure 5.2: Senate, Disaster Relief Policy 1954-2005
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Comparing each chamber’s treatment of natural disasters reveals periods of 
incongruence not evident in the civil defense policy arena (figure 5.4). On the one hand, 
the House and Senate series mirror one another for the period 1945 through 1977 with a 
steady increase in attention over time. While the steady increase continues in the House 
up through 1990, it drops off precipitously in the Senate and is marked by a steady 
decline in attention until the events of Hurricane Katrina in 2005. In the 1990s, the House 
also assumes this steady decline in attention to natural disasters until the events of 
Hurricane Katrina.  
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Figure 5.3: Civil Defense Hearings, 1945-2005
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5.2. Policy Jurisdiction and Committee Competition 
 To explore the institutional agenda further, figures 5.5-5.8 identify the committees 
that hold hearings in natural disaster and civil defense policy in the House and the Senate. 
As Birkland (1998), among others has noted with regard to effort to formulate policy to 
deal with hurricanes, disaster relief policy in both chambers appears nearly anarchic 
(figures 5.5 and 5.6). Rather than asking who controls disaster relief policy, one might 
instead be inclined to ask who does not control disaster relief policy.  In all, thirteen 
committees in the House and a dozen in the Senate are regular players in the policy 
realm, with competition the norm during any particular year, as well as the dominant 
motif over time. Quite simply, no one appears in charge. 
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 Compare this to the situation in the realm of civil defense (figures 5.7 and 5.8).  
While it might be hard to image more committee involvement in a realm than that found 
in the natural disasters, I identified fourteen committees in the House and sixteen in the 
Senate who made a regular appearance in the civil defense realm over the course of the 
study. This policy realm displays more of the features of a policy monopoly or subsystem 
than is the case in natural disaster policy.  While there are a wide variety of committees 
that show up in six or more years between 1945 and 2006, there are much fewer regular 
players. The Armed Service Committee is the dominant player in both chambers, 
followed by Government Operations/Government Affairs Committee.  It is not until 2002 
that civil defense becomes subject to the intense competition and conflict that 
characterizes disaster relief policy.  Even then, Armed Services Committee maintains its 
presence in the policy realm, although the renamed Senate Homeland Security and 
Government Affairs Committee grab the largest portion of turf, followed closely by the 
Judiciary Committee (at least initially).   Similarly, the Homeland Security Committee is 
a major new player in the House, although it appears to be involved in a realm 
characterized by oligopoly, sharing near equal space with Judiciary and Government 
Operations Committee.  
 This increased attention and the number of committees involved in the civil 
defense realm supports the argument by Cobb and Elder (1972, 35) that agenda setting, 
particularly the institutional agenda setting, is routinely characterized by the degree of 
competition between sides. Additionally, attempts by various committees to determine 
the civil defense agenda in 2002, confirms the work of Baumgartner of Jones (1993), who 
indicate that most punctuating events lead to an increase in committee competition. 
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Notably, the rise in competition during this crisis period (i.e. the attacks of September 11, 
2001) coincides with the committee competition present during the referral of bill 
introductions that was discusses in the previous chapter.   
 Overall, the initial foray into mapping attention and turf control suggests that civil 
defense operates much like the classic policy monopoly, anchored by the Armed Service 
committees which enjoy near monopoly control, interspaced with brief periods of 
competition, and relatively low salience. The events of September 2001 served as a storm 
in this relative calm, producing a new subsystem anchor in the Senate and 
institutionalizing competition in the House. Given this analysis, I am puzzled by the 
seemingly institutionalized anarchy found in the natural disaster policy realm, a subject to 
which I now turn.  
 
Figure 5.5: House, Natural Disaster Hearings: Committee Competition 
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Figure 5.6: Senate, Natural Disaster Hearings: Committee Competition 
 
 
Figure 5.7: House, Civil Defense Hearings 1945-2005
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5.3. The Topic of Discussion 
Picking up on an observation of Birkland (1998), who noted how focusing events 
affect the shape of policy communities, I developed a coding instrument intended to 
pinpoint the multiple dimensions of disaster relief policy.  Birkland (1998, 62) found the 
earthquake community was more “coherent, organized and ongoing” than was the case 
with the policy community dealing with hurricanes. In view of this argument, one might 
expect the identity and variety of committees involved in the discussion of earthquakes to 
be markedly different than that focused on hurricanes (controlling for the free-for-all 
associated with a punctuating event). By tracking the committees involved in various 
aspects of disaster relief, I will be able to determine whether what looks like system level 
chaos actually masks a more orderly process. Utilizing the advanced search function of 
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Figure 5.8: Senate, Civil Defense Hearings 1945-2005
 
83 
 
the CIS, I broke disasters down by types, conducting separate searches for floods, storms, 
tornadoes, fires, hurricanes, and earthquakes—six of the eight search terms produces 
under “natural disaster’ heading. By doing so, I am looking for evidence that the various 
sub-fields of disaster policy operate along lines associated with policy communities or 
subsystems; that is, there is some coherence as to how Congress processes the various 
issues.  
Figures 5.9 and 5.10 track the committees involved in each policy realm for the 
House and Senate respectively.  
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Figure 5.9: House, Natural Disaster Relief Policy by Topic
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Based on the figures, only tornadoes in the House fit the criteria for a classic 
policy monopoly, although many of policy realms find the bulk of hearings held by two 
or three committees, suggesting a division of turf, very typical of a competitive 
subsystem. Still, hearings dealing with storms in both chambers and hurricanes hearings 
in the House appear to be a free for all, and fire hearings in the House are close to 
becoming one.  
Conclusion 
 
       This chapter presents the level of congressional attention and debate given to disaster 
relief policy. In Chapter Two, I noted the Baumgartner and Jones (1993) theory, which 
suggested policy equilibrium are a product of institutional arrangements and issue 
framing. While the general consensus is that policy equilibrium is not static, the existence 
of subsystems have functioned as wavering equilibrium against accepting a chaos theory 
Figure 5.10: Senate, Natural Disaster Relief Policy by Topic
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of public policy. Quite simply, subsystem arrangements are dynamic, with change a 
product of some combination of macro-level events and internal (coalition-based) 
dynamics.  Although it may not be anarchy incarnate, the natural disaster policy realm is 
unusually chaotic. I believe that the chaos exhibited may have something with the nature 
of such events. They are unexpected, even when, like hurricanes, they occur with a 
certain amount of regularity. As such, their consequences are difficult to predict and 
control. To some extent, they affect large areas of the population, so they invite 
widespread participation. By contrast, so much civil defense involves preparation for an 
event that may or may not occur, at least until September 11, 2001. This allowed a civil 
defense policy system to develop that looked more like the standard institution-based 
system for much of the 20th century.  Overall, it seems that the near chaos found in 
natural disaster hearings mirror the introduction and legislative referrals observed in the 
previous chapter.  
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Chapter Six 
 
Concluding Comments 
 
 
I began this study with two objectives. The first was to examine the origins and 
evolution of disaster relief policy in order to understand its shifting image. The second 
was to understand how Congress governs the agenda of disaster relief policy in the post-
war period.  
So what does the research say about agenda setting and disaster relief policy? 
First, the research confirms the observations of most scholars who assert that agenda 
setting is a dynamic and inherently complex political process. In the case of my research, 
three observations stand out: (1) Focusing events impact issue salience, (2) the 
multidimensional nature of disaster relief policy allows various dimension of the issue to 
gain agenda access and (3) the disaster relief policy subsystem has been formed through 
incremental historical processes.  
Disaster relief policy exhibited two distinct traits. First, the civil defense 
subsystem functions primarily as a “dominant coalition.” Worsham suggests that in a 
dominant coalition scenario “ a committee or subcommittee is able to establish 
unquestioned jurisdiction in a particular policy area”(1997, 3). However, in the case of a 
punctuating event, the policy equilibrium maintained by the dominant coalition tends to 
be disrupted, leading to the emergence of previously excluded interests into the 
subsystem. The study reveals a change in policy outcome as a result of the events of 
September 11, 2001. Still, findings indicate that the Armed Services Committee in both 
chambers is the dominant venue in civil defense policy, even when attention to the issue 
is elevated.  
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Second, the natural disaster subsystem functions primarily as a “competitive 
coalition.” As other scholars argue, in a competitive coalition scenario, competition may 
be the result of challenges by members of other committees (and subsystems), who in 
response to perceived threats to their autonomy, engage in turf wars (Worsham, 1997; 
Ripley and Franklin, 1986; and King, 1997). In this study, these turf wars are elevated 
when punctuating events occur, and as a result, the natural disaster policy realm is 
unusually chaotic. That said, even during “normal times” the policy realm is one that 
borders on near anarchy, with a wide variety of committees claiming a piece of the policy 
domain. In regard to setting the disaster relief policy agenda in Congress, changes that 
occur happen in both an incremental and radical fashion. When radical change occurs, the 
old ways of doing things are replaced by new organizational forms (Baumgartner and 
Jones, 1993, 235). For example, prior to 1950, disasters were viewed as “Acts of God.” 
The accident at the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant then necessitated the creation 
of FEMA. FEMA was later restructured, reorganized and eventually moved to DHS 
following the attacks of September 11, 2001. The Congressional agenda of disaster relief 
policy is thus reactive in nature and characterized by the occurrence of organizational 
change  associated with punctuating events.  
 
Aside from the approach taken in this study, there are certainly other venues and 
perspectives to explore which would be useful for future research. For example, future 
research could focus on the role of subcommittees in agenda setting, as well as highlight 
the likely influence they may have in policy changes (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993, 
202). At the macro-level, future research focusing on the Red Cross would enrich the 
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literature on subsystem and policymaking. In addition, taking a closer look at the 
presidency and the courts are another equally beneficial aspects to explore. While the 
analysis would explore whether the actions of the president are linked to congressional 
activities and efforts of issue redefinition, it would also explicitly assess whether 
decisions rendered by the court disrupt the turf monopoly.  
On the micro-level, focusing exclusively on how states and local governments 
comply or fail to comply with federal guidelines can be of further research and 
usefulness. For example, examining the response of the Governor of Louisiana and the 
Mayor of New Orleans during and in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina would further 
illustrate how communication and coordination can influence program delivery (Cropf, 
2008). Furthermore, such an examination would also highlight the complexities of a 
principal-agent relationship that have been noted by various scholars (Golden, 2000; 
Brehm and Gates, 1999; Mitnick, 1984). In conclusion, the congressional approach 
utilized for this research is only a beginning step in exploring the dynamic evolution of 
disaster relief policy.  
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Appendix 
Table 4.1: Civil Defense Bill Introductions by Session 
Year Session House Senate 
1947 80 3 4 
1949 81 3 20 
1951 82 3 26 
1953 83 2 18 
1955 84 17 10 
1957 85 24 6 
1959 86 2 6 
1961 87 25 8 
1963 88 11 2 
1965 89 1 2 
1967 90 1 0 
1969 91 3 0 
1971 92 4 0 
1973 93 4 0 
1975 94 12 2 
1977 95 12 1 
1979 96 9 2 
1981 97 3 1 
1983 98 2 1 
1985 99 2 0 
1987 100 2 2 
1989 101 3 3 
1991 102 2 1 
1993 103 0 0 
1995 104 0 0 
1997 105 0 0 
1999 106 1 0 
2001 107 2 1 
2003 108 12 7 
2005 109 6 4 
Total  171 127 
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Table 4.2: Disaster Relief Bill Introductions by Session 
Year Session House Senate 
1947 80 29 14 
1949 81 18 10 
1951 82 17 10 
1953 83 13 18 
1955 84 83 20 
1957 85 28 8 
1959 86 21 0 
1961 87 23 2 
1963 88 26 14 
1965 89 100 28 
1967 90 113 6 
1969 91 45 18 
1971 92 88 70 
1973 93 96 24 
1975 94 70 10 
1977 95 71 14 
1979 96 44 11 
1981 97 25 11 
1983 98 23 11 
1985 99 14 15 
1987 100 13 9 
1989 101 45 11 
1991 102 27 13 
1993 103 49 18 
1995 104 19 6 
1997 105 23 16 
1999 106 21 19 
2001 107 55 32 
2003 108 16 7 
2005 109 37 4 
Total  1.252 449 
 
